Bankruptcy Annotations (Agricultural Law and Tax)

This page contains summaries of significant developments involving farm and ranch-related as well as commercial fishing bankruptcies and related legislation.

Posted July 2, 2020

Court Determines Interest Rate in Chapter 12 Case. The debtor is a family farming operation engaged in apple, cherry, alfalfa, seed corn and other crop production. The parents of the family own 100 percent of the debtor. In 2014, the debtor changed its primary lender which extended a line of credit to the debtor that the father personally guaranteed and a term loan to the debtor that the father also personally guaranteed. The lender held a first-priority security interest in various real and personal property to secure loan repayment. The debtor became unable to repay the line of credit and the default caused defaults on the term loan and the guarantees. The lender sued to foreclose on its collateral and have a receiver appointed. The debtor then filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and proposed a reorganization plan where it would continue farming under 2020-2024 in accordance with proposed budgets through 2024. The plan provided for repayment of all creditors in full. The plan proposed to repay then lender over 20 years at a 4.5 percent interest rate (prime rate of 3.25 percent plus 1.25 percent). The lender opposed plan confirmation. In determining whether the reorganization plan was fair and equitable to the lender based on the facts, the court noted the father’s lengthy experience in farming and familiarity with the business and that the farm manager was experienced and professional. The court also noted that parents had extensive experience with crop insurance and that they were committing unencumbered personal assets to the plan. The court also noted the debtor’s shift in recent years to more profitable crops and a demonstrated ability to manage around cash flow difficulties, and that the lender would be “meaningfully oversecured.” The court also determined that the debtor’s farming budgets appeared to be based on reasonable assumptions and forecasted consistent annual profitability. However, the court did not that the debtor had a multi-year history of operating losses in recent years; was heavily reliant on crop insurance; was engaged in an inherently risky business subject to forces beyond the debtor’s control; had no permanent long-term leases in place for the considerable amount of acreage that it leased; could not anticipate how the Chinese Virus would impact the business into the future; and proposed a lengthy post-confirmation obligation to the lender. Accordingly, the court made an upward adjustment to the debtor’s prosed additional 1.25 percent to the prime rate by increasing it by at least 1.75 percent. The court scheduled a conference with the parties to discuss how to proceed. In re Key Farms, Inc., No. 19-02949-WLH12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1642 (Bankr. D. Wash. Jun. 23, 2020).

Withheld Tax Subject to Non-Priority Treatment. The debtors filed Chapter 12 and sold a significant amount of farmland and farming machinery in 2017, triggering almost a $1 million of capital gain income and increasing their 2017 tax liability significantly. The tax liability was offset to a degree by income tax withholding from the wife’s off-farm job. Their amended Chapter 12 plan called for a refund to the estate of withheld federal and state income taxes. In the fall of 2019, the debtors submitted pro forma state and federal tax returns as well as their traditional tax returns for 2017 to the bankruptcy court in conjunction with the confirmation of their amended Chapter 12 plan. The pro-forma returns showed what the debtors’ tax liability would have been without the sale of the farmland and farm equipment. The pro-forma returns also showed, but for the capital gain, the debtors would have been entitled to a full tax refund of the taxes already withheld from the wife’s off-farm job. The amended plan required the IRS and the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) to refund to the debtors’ bankruptcy estate withheld income taxes. The taxing authorities objected, claiming that the withheld amounts had already been applied against the debtor’s tax debt as 11 U.S.C. §553(a) allowed. The debtors claimed that 2017 legislation barred tax debt arising from the sale of assets used in farming from being offset against previously collected tax. Instead, the debtors argued, the withheld taxes should be returned to the bankruptcy estate. If withheld taxes weren’t returned to the bankruptcy estate, the debtors argued, similarly situated debtors would be treated differently. The court was faced with the issue of whether 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) entitled the bankruptcy estate to a refund of the withheld tax. The IRS and IDOR claimed that 11 U.S.C. §553(a) preserved priority position for tax debt that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed. The court disagreed, noting that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) deals specifically with how governmental claims involving pre-petition tax debt are to be treated – as unsecured, non-priority obligations. But the court noted that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) does not specifically address “clawing-back” previously withheld tax. It merely referred to “qualifying tax debt” and said it was to be treated as unsecured and not entitled to priority. Referencing the legislative history behind both the 2005 and 2017 amendments, the court noted that the purpose of the priority-stripping provision was to help farmers have a better chance at reorganization by de-prioritizing taxes, including capital gain taxes. The court pointed to statements that Sen. Charles Grassley made to that effect. The court also noted that the 2017 amendment was for the purpose of strengthening (and clarifying) the original 2005 de-prioritization provision by overturning the result in Hall to allow for de-prioritization of taxes arising from both pre and post-petitions sales of assets used in farming. Accordingly, the court concluded that 11 U.S.C. §1232(a) overrode a creditor’s set-off rights under 11 U.S.C. §553(a) in the context of Chapter 12. The debtors’ bankruptcy estate was entitled to a refund of the withheld income taxes. In In re DeVries, No. 19-0018, 2020 U.S. Bankr. LEXIS 1154 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2020).

Posted June 14, 2020

SBA Exclusion From PPP of Applicants With Owners in Bankruptcy Not Allowed. The debtor is the sole shareholder and owner of all of the equity interests in a company (a childcare center) that applied for a Paycheck Protection Program loan of approximately $70,000 on April 15 in order to be able to continue in business by paying wages, benefits and taxes – all permissible uses. The debtor had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 5. The Small Business Administration (SBA) did not process the application due to the answer to Question No. 1 on the application form which disclosed that the owner of the applicant, the debtor, was in bankruptcy. The SBA took the position that the approval of any PPP loan was contingent on the applicant or any owner of the applicant not being "presently involved in any bankruptcy," even though this condition is not articulated in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the "CARES Act") that enacts the PPP, or in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631, et seq. The company alleged that the PPP is in reality a support or grant program rather than a loan program, and sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction directing the SBA to consider the PPP application without considering the debtor’s status as a Chapter 11 debtor. The court noted that the anti-discrimination provision of 11 U.S.C. §525(a) provides that: “…a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act. The court determined that the SBA exceeded its authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by excluding businesses from PPP eligibility when the owner is in bankruptcy. The PPP, the court noted is not a typical loan program, instead it is a grant or support program. PPP eligibility does not include creditworthiness with repayment not being a significant part of the program. The court noted that the purpose of the PPP is to protect the employment and livelihood of employees who, through no fault of their own, have found their places of employment closed due to the China virus. That purpose would be frustrated the court determined, if the Court did not grant the requested preliminary injunction. Skefos v. Carranza, No. 19-29718-L, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1479 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Jun. 3, 2020).

Posted May 31, 2020

Chapter 12 Debtor Barred From Receiving PPP Loan. In late 2018, the debtors, a married couple operating a farm dairy operation, filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy. On the same day, their wholly-owned, limited liability company (LLC) entity that runs the daily farming and dairy operation filed a separate Chapter 12 petition. The debtors direct the farming operation and own the real estate and improvements. The cases were jointly administered, and the debtors’ second amended plan was confirmed on May 8, 2019. The debtors’ income comes primarily from milk sales and from the sale of culled cows. Due to the economic crisis created by various state governors as a result of the China Virus, the debtors’ milk sale revenue declined by more than 30 percent. Since January of 2019, the wholesale price of milk declined from nearly $19.00 to $12.50 per cwt. In addition, due to slaughterhouse closures, the debtors received much lower than historical prices for their culled cow sales. The debtors listed a significant mortgage and utility expenses on the schedules and noted that they employ 14 people with an average monthly payroll of $59,835. The debtors applied for a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan from the Small Business Administration (SBA) and were rejected because of their pending bankruptcy case. They otherwise met the requirements of the PPP. Without the loan, there was no doubt that the debtors would be forced to lay off essential employees and would be potentially driven out of business. The debtors then filed for Declaratory Judgment, Writ of Mandamus and Injunctive Relief against the SBA. The court rejected the debtors’ claims and dismissed the complaint. The court noted that the SBA’s Fourth Interim Final Rule, Section III (4) specified that a debtor in bankruptcy is not eligible for a PPP loan, and that such position did not violate the anti-discrimination provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. §525(a). Those provisions bar the government from revoking, suspending, or refusing to renew “a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” based on a person either being in or having been a debtor in bankruptcy. The court concluded that the PPP is a subsidized loan program and not a “license, permit, charter, franchise or other similar grant” and falls outside the scope of 11 U.S.C. §525(a). Instead, the PPP constitutes a loan that may be forgiven if the loan funds are used in certain ways. The court also determined that the SBA’s Fourth Interim Rule did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While the underlying statute (15 U.S.C. §636(a)(36)(F)(i)) is silent on whether bankrupt debtors are ineligible for PPP loans, the court noted that there was nothing in the statute that suggested the Congress intended to limit the SBA’s rulemaking or that the Congress provided an exhaustive list of eligibility requirements that the SBA couldn’t supplement via rulemaking. Thus, the Fourth Interim Final rule was not beyond the SBA’s delegated authority. In addition, the court held that the Fourth Interim Final Rule did not violate the APA for being arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that had the Congress intended to bar the SBA from denying loan eligibility to applicants in bankruptcy, it could have done so. Schuessler v. United States SBA, No. 20-02065-bhl, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1347 (E.D. Wisc. May 22, 2020).

Posted May 27, 2020

Milk Quota Is Collateral, But Milk and Milk Sale Income is Not. The debtor, a dairy farming operation, filed Chapter 12 in late 2018. The debtor owns a raw milk production quota authorizing it to produce fresh milk in a specified quantity. In early 2019, a creditor sought to bar the debtor from using its cash collateral, and the court entered such an interim order. All milk quota production was being paid to the creditor. At a subsequent hearing on the matter, the court questioned the extent of the creditor’s lien, but acknowledged the validity of the creditor’s lien over the milk quota. The issue in the case was whether the milk produced by the debtor’s cows and the income it generates is collateral to the creditor’s loan pursuant to the creditor’s security agreement and financing statement. The bankruptcy trustee claimed that the cows were not included as collateral and that the cows produced the milk rather than the quota, and that the milk the debtor sold amounted to an account receivable. The court noted that the creditor’s security agreement did not specify that the dairy cows or raw milk served as collateral to the loans, and that the milk quota is an asset with value determined by market conditions. However, the milk quota does not produce milk. Thus, because the creditor’s collateral does not include the debtor’s cows, its security interest does not attach to any identifiable proceeds of the cows. Thus, the court determined that the milk produced by the cows, and the income it generated, was not part of the creditor’s collateral. Consequently, the debtor was not barred from using the cash collateral and could more readily put together a feasible Chapter 12 plan. In re Vaqueria Las Martas, Inc., No. 18-07304 (ESL), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1020 (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 15, 2020).

Posted May 23, 2020

FSA Not Entitled To Set-Off Subsidy Payments. The debtors (husband and wife) borrowed $300,000 from the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in late 2010. The debtors enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program and the Market Facilitation Program administered by the FSA. The debtors filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in mid-2018 and converted it to a Chapter 12 bankruptcy in late 2019. The debtors defaulted on the FSA loan after converting their case to Chapter 12. The debtors were entitled to receive approximately $40,000 of total MFP and PLC payments post-petition. The FSA sought a set-off of the pre-petition debt with the post-petition subsidy payments. The court refused to the set-off under 11 U.S.C. §553 noting that the offsetting obligations did not both arise prepetition and were not mutual as required by 11 U.S.C. §553(a). There was no question, the court opined, that the FSA’s obligation to pay subsidy payments arose post-petition and that the debtors’ obligation to FSA arose pre-petition. In Re Roberts, No. 18-11927-t12, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1338 (Bankr. D. N.M. May 19, 2020).

Posted February 21, 2020

“Roberts Tax” Is Not An Excise Tax Entitled to Priority Treatment. The debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The IRS filed a proof of priority claim for $5,100.10, later amending the claim to $5,795.10 with $695 of that amount being an excise tax under I.R.C. §5000A as a result of the debtor’s failure to maintain government mandated health insurance under Obamacare. The debtor objected to the $695 amount being a priority claim that could not be discharged, and the bankruptcy court agreed, finding that the “Roberts Tax” under Obamacare was not a priority claim, but rather a dischargeable penalty in a Chapter 13 case. On appeal, the federal trial court reversed. The trial court noted that the creditor bore the burden to establish that the Roberts Tax was a priority claim and noted that it was the purpose and substance of the statute creating the tax that controlled whether the tax was a tax or a penalty. The trial court noted that a tax is a pecuniary burden levied for the purpose of supporting government while a monetary penalty is a punishment for an unlawful act or omission. On this point, the trial court noted that Chief Justice Roberts, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), upheld the constitutionality of Obamacare on the basis that the “shared responsibility payment” was a tax paid via a federal income tax return and had no application to persons who did not pay federal income tax. The trial court noted that the amount was collected by the IRS and produced revenue for the government. It also did not punish an individual for any unlawful activity and, the trial court noted, the IRS has no criminal enforcement authority if a taxpayer failed to pay the amount. On further review, the appellate court reversed, reinstating the bankruptcy court’s determination. The appellate court held that the “Roberts Tax” was not entitled to priority in bankruptcy because it was not among the types of taxes listed in the bankruptcy code to have priority treatment under 11 U.SC. §507(a)(8)(E)(i). The appellate court noted that the “Roberts Tax” could not be a priority tax claim in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate because the “tax” applied only when a person failed to buy the government-mandated health insurance, rather than when a transaction was entered into. As such, the “Roberts Tax” was a penalty that could be discharged in bankruptcy. The appellate court also noted that the “tax” zeroed out the “tax” beginning in 2019, thereby nullifying any tax effect that it might have had. United States v. Chesteen, No. 19-30195 (5 th Cir. Feb. 20, 2020), rev’g., No. 18-2077, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29346 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2019).

Posted February 15, 2020

Cram-Down Interest Rate Determined. The debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the debtor and the bank could not agree on the appropriate interest rate to be used in the debtor’s reorganization plan. The parties agreed that the “Prime Plus” method set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) was the appropriate method to determine the “cram down” interest rate.” The parties agreed that the prime rate was presently 4.75 percent and that an additional amount as a “risk factor” should be added to the prime rate. The debtors proposed a 6 percent interest rate, based on the risk associated with their dairy business. The bank claimed that the appropriate interest rate was 7.75 percent – the highest rate factor under the Till analysis. The bank cited the length of the plan, the volatility of dairy market, the debtor’s capital structure, and conflicting projections from an expert when determining the appropriate risk factor. The court determined that the appropriate interest rate was 7 percent which raised the interest rate on some of the debtor’s loans and lowering it on others. In re Country Morning Farms, Inc., No. 19-00478-FPC11, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 307 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2020).

Posted February 2, 2020

Educational Loans Nondischargeable. The debtor attended the University of Michigan from 1999-2003, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Musical Arts. She financed her education with borrowing $76,049 from the creditor. Each loan application that the debtor signed indicated that the debtor understood that the loan proceeds were to be used for educational purposes and that disbursements would be sent to the school either by check or wire. The debtor filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2017 and listed the debt to the creditor as general unsecured debt, asserting that is was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8). The debtor later filed an adversary proceeding seeking in the bankruptcy court seeking a determination whether the debt was actually dischargeable. The bankruptcy court determined that the debt was nondischargeable “qualified educational loan” debt. On further review, the trial court affirmed. The trial court framed the issue as whether the debtor’s loans were an “other educational loan” as defined in I.R.C. §221(d)(1) which is used for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8). The trial court noted that 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) provides that a debtor is generally not discharged from any debt that constitutes “any other educational loan that is a qualified educational loan,” as defined in I.R.C. §221(d)(1) that is incurred by an individual solely to pay qualified higher educational expenses. The debtor argued that the word “solely” meant that if the proceeds could be used for anything other than qualified higher education expenses, the loans could be discharged. The trial court disagreed, noting that the “qualified higher education” expenses is further defined in 20 U.S.C. §1087 as including miscellaneous expenses.” The overall purpose of the loans, the trial court noted, was for educational purposes. Here, the trial court noted, the five loans were predicated on the debtor’s status as a student and were intended to be used for educational purposes at the time they were made based on the plain language of the loan applications. Conti v. Arrowood Indemnity Company, No. 2:18-cv-13467, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9428 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2020).

Posted January 15, 2020

Debt Non-Dischargeable in Bankrutpcy To Extent Derived From Fraud. The creditor is a landowner and the debtor is the farm tenant who put up hay and other crops on the creditor’s land. The parties did not have a written lease agreement, but the landlord/creditor assumed the lease was a 50-50 crop share agreement where the parties would spit the expenses and the sale proceeds equally. The record was unclear as to what the tenant understood the relationship to be, but he did make statements to others that it was a cash rent lease. The tenant did not pay the landlord after the first two cuttings of hay because he incurred expenses while cutting. After the third cutting was bailed the landlord contacted the tenant about payment. The tenant told the landlord that he could have the proceeds from the third cutting of hay and that the tenant was finished farming for the landlord. The tenant paid a third party to stack the hay. When the landlord attempted to sell the hay he discovered that the tenant had already given the hay to a third party to settle a debt. Both parties submitted expenses related to the hay crop that year. The landlord filed a complaint in the tenant’s bankruptcy case alleging fraud and misrepresentation, and seeking that the debt to the landlord not be discharged. The bankruptcy court agreed, determining that the landlord proved that the tenant’s obligation of $5,916.50 was exempt from discharge because of the debtor’s false representation. The bankruptcy court determined that the full debt owed to the landlord was $22,292.84 based on the oral lease, but that the only part of that amount derived from fraud was the amount related to the third cutting of hay - $5,370.50 plus $546 for stacking. The balance of the unpaid debt arose from a general misunderstanding that wasn’t settled before the debtor put up the first two hay cuttings. The only blatant dishonesty, the bankruptcy court determined, concerned the third cutting.  In re Kurtz, 604 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2019).

Posted January 5, 2020

Notice of Sale Under 11 U.S.C. § 363 (b) Constitutes Notice Under 11 U.S.C. §363(f). An involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy was brought against the debtor. The trustee moved to sell the estate’s only asset, farm ground, free and clear of all interests except tax liens under 11 U.S.C. §363(f) and to certify the buyer as a good-faith purchaser under 11 U.S.C. §363(m), thereby exempting the sale from challenge. The debtor’s parents claimed that they had an interest in the land and objected to the sale. The trustee suggested that the sale go through and that the buyer and debtor’s parents sort out the parent’s purported interest in state court. The bankruptcy court agreed and allowed the sale pursuant to section 11 U.S.C. §363(b). The debtor appealed and argued that the order to sell his farm under 11 U.S.C. §363(b) was entered without notice because the trustee had moved for a sale under 11 U.S.C. §363(f). The trial court disagreed and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s sale, determining that notice was sufficient. On further review, the appellate court affirmed. The debtor claimed that the court changed course from 11 U.S.C. §363(f) to 11 U.S.C. §363(b, and that the bankruptcy court was constitutionally obligated to request briefing on section (b) before approving the sale. The appellate court disagreed, noting that sections (f) and (b) are not mutually exclusive. Rather, section (f) allows the trustee sell under section(b) under certain conditions. Thus, notice under section (f) is also notice of section (b.) In addition, the debtor was not prejudiced by the sale because the sale left fewer claims for the debtor to pay, leaving the chance of a residue. In addition, the debtor’s parents could assert their ownership in state court. The appellate court also refused to modify the bankruptcy court’s order so that the sale was free and clear of interests under 11 U.S.C. §363(f). Kelly v. Herrell, 781 F. App'x 529 (7th Cir. 2019).

Posted November 24, 2019

Bankruptcy Plan Not Approved. In the debtor’s second proposed bankruptcy plan, the plan acknowledged the increased role in the farming operation of the debtor’s daughter. The plan also changed the cropping from cotton to corn due to weather issues, specified how debt would be paid, but did not account for taxes. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the plan. The court noted that the plan mixed the debtor’s assets with those of the daughter and specified that the daughter’s debts would be paid before the debtor’s secured creditors. The court also concluded that the plan was not feasible in that it didn’t provide for any distribution to the debtor for living expenses after the payment of creditors. In addition, the commingling of assets of the farming operation with the daughter’s assets also lead to the conclusion on lack of feasibility. However, the court concluded that the plan was proposed in good faith. In re Graves Farms, Nos. 18-10893, 19-10064, 19-10982, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2331 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jul. 26, 2019).

Posted September 29, 2019

Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Plan Approved. At issue in the case was whether the debtor’s Chapter 12 bankruptcy plan would be approved. The debtor’s farming operation was conducted via a limited liability company (LLC). The aggregate debt did not exceed the applicable limit and more than 50% of the debt arose from farming. The plan also addressed objections that had been raised to the debtor’s prior proposed plan concerning valuation and treatment of a secured claim. The plan was also determined to have been proposed in good faith and provided the unsecureds with more than they would have received in a Chapter 7 case. The court also determined that the debtor would be able to comply with the plan and that it was feasible. The court confirmed the debtor’s Chapter 12 reorganization plan. In re Silva, No. 18-01618, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1813 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jun. 12, 2019).

Posted September 7, 2019

Prior Bankruptcy Filings Extends Non-Dischargeability Period. The debtor filed Chapter 7 in late 2018 after not filing his 2013 and 2014 returns. The 2013 return was due on October 15, 2014, and the 2014 return was due April 15, 2015. The debtor had previously filed bankruptcy in late 2014 (Chapter 13). That prior case was dismissed in early 2015. The debtor filed another bankruptcy petition in late 2015 (Chapter 11). Based on the facts, the debtor had been in bankruptcy proceedings during the relevant time period, (October 15, 2014, through October 25, 2018) for a total of 311 days. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) provides, in general, that a discharge of debt in bankruptcy does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for an income tax for the periods specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). One of the periods provided under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8), contained in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), is, the three years before filing a bankruptcy petition. Also, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) specifies that an otherwise applicable time period specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) is suspended for any time during which the stay of proceedings was in effect in a prior bankruptcy case or during which collection was precluded by the existence of one or more confirmed bankruptcy plans, plus 90 days. When a debtor files multiple, successive bankruptcy cases, the ordinary operation of the automatic stay 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) is altered by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) which specifies that if a debtor had a case pending within the preceding one-year period that was dismissed, then the automatic stay with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing that debt terminates with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case. The debtor sought to have his 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities discharged in the present bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(A) on the basis that the filing dates for those returns were outside the three-year look-back period. The IRS took the position that the three-year “look-back” period was extended due to the debtor's bankruptcy filings. The court agreed with the IRS, noting that the three-year look-back period began on October 25, 2015. However, the court concluded that an issue remained as to whether the look-back period extended back 401 days, or only for the first 30 days following each bankruptcy filing as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Based on a review of applicable bankruptcy case law, the court concluded that the tolling provision of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) was not impacted by the automatic nature of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Instead, for purposes of the tolling provision, the stay of proceedings was in effect in each of debtor's three previous cases until each was dismissed. Therefore, the court found that the look-back period extended back three years plus 401 days. Since the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in the present case on October 25, 2018, the three-year plus 401-day look-back period reached back to September 19, 2014. Because the debtor's 2013 and 2014 tax liabilities were due after that date (including the extension for the 2013 liability), neither was dischargeable in the current bankruptcy case. Nachimson v. United States, No. 18-14479-SAH, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2696 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2019).

Posted July 13, 2019

Chapter 12 Amended Plan Not Confirmable. In 2012, the debtors, a married couple, purchased a ranch consisting of 1,600 deeded acres and 2,800 acres leased from the state. The ranch included a 990-head certified feedlot. The debtors purchased the ranch for $1,190,000, with the creditor financing the purchase. In 2015, the debtors purchased a second ranch for $1,850,000 consisting of 2,610 deeded acres, plus 1,280 acres leased from the state and 800 acres leased from the Bureau of Land Management. Some of the privately held land was surrounded by public land. Existing leases remained with the deeded acres. The creditor collateralized the loan with both ranches, along with associated personal property. Doing so allowed the creditor to use the equity in the first ranch to get the loan to value. The debtors had hoped to roll both ranch loans into a single loan, but poor cattle markets kept the creditor from doing this. Ultimately, the debtors needed to pay down on the line of credit but were not able to do so. The debtor and creditor came to an agreement that one of the ranches needed to be sold. Both ranches were listed for sale and the second ranch received an offer for $3,000,000, but the counteroffer of $3,650,000 (which was what the realtor had apprised the land for) was declined. The debtors then filed Chapter 12. In 2017, the debtors obtained a Farm Service Agency (FSA) loan in the amount of $300,000 (FSA Loan). As of April 1, 2019, the creditor estimated that the debtors still owed $3,875,612.86, with interest accruing at $574.74 per day. The debtors’ plan proposed the transfer of the second ranch to the creditor with the liens on the first ranch and associated personal property being extinguished. The debtors also proposed to reduce the size of their cattle herd by more than half - down to a base herd of 215 cows. The sale proceeds would be utilized to pay for tax obligations from the transfer of the second ranch to the creditor, as well as to pay the first set of payments to other creditors. Finally, the debtors proposed to pay the proceeds from the yearly sale of calves and culled cows to fund annual payments to the remaining creditors. An amendment to the plan provided that the surrender of the second ranch to creditor fully satisfied the debtors’ obligations to the creditor and that payment could not be sought from the FSA under the loan guarantee. The amended plan also contained the agreed amount of the FSA’s allowed secured claim on the promissory note, as well as the terms of payment of the loan under the plan. The creditor objected to the amended plan because the plan failed to satisfy 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5). The court agreed with the creditor because the plan only surrendered some of the secured property to the creditor. Instead, the amended plan proposed to extinguish the debtors’ obligation on the first ranch which meant that confirmation should have been sought under 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5)(B) rather than (a)(5)(C). In addition, the court determined that the liquidation value of the second ranch did not cover the creditor’s debts and costs based on the debt-to-value ratio and because it was not likely that the second ranch could be sold for its appraised value. In re Holland, No. 18-40986-JMM, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2037 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jul. 3, 2019).

Posted July 5, 2019

Chapter 12 Plan Proposed In Good Faith, But Not Feasible. The debtor is a farmer that granted the bank a first priority lien on all farm assets other than a truck and cash proceeds to the 2017 crop. To pay for the 2017 inputs, the debtors secured financing though another creditor (not the bank). The creditor obtained a subordination agreement from the bank, giving the creditor a $151,000 first priority lien in the 2017 crop sale proceeds. However, the proceeds from the 2017 crop were not enough to repay the creditor or continue making payments to the bank. The debtors filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in May of 2018. The debtor sold the 2017 crops and various equipment to repay secured creditors. The creditor’s remaining claim is $107,506.45, $66,625.37 of which is secured by the remaining 2017 crop sale proceeds that the debtor still held. The parties agreed that the bank's secured claim wa $214,093.86 for purposes of plan confirmation. The creditors filed a motion for relief, collecting the remainder of the 2017 crop proceeds. The debtor filed a motion to use cash collateral to start a cattle feeding operation and grant the creditor a lien in the cattle and feed. The debtor also proposed to use rental payments from the grain bins on their property, to make interest payments to the creditor and the bank for five years. The entire principal of the loans would come due as a balloon payment at the end of the plan period. The bank, the Chapter 12 Trustee, the Iowa Department of Revenue, and the creditor objected to the debtor’s plan. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s proposed plan and motion to use cash collateral. The creditor’s motion for relief of stay was granted due to the court finding that the debtor’s plan was not feasible. The court denied the plan for multiple reasons. First the plan impermissibly substituted the creditor’s lien in the crop with a lien in cattle. Second the plan impermissibly utilized rental payments covered by the bank lien for payments towards the other creditors. The court also determined that the debtor’s proposed interest rate was not correct. The court agreed with the bank and the creditor that the plan is not feasible based on the information in the record. The debtor’s health, overly optimistic rental rates for the grain bins, and the balloon payment all factored in the court’s decision of lack of feasibility, even though the plan was submitted in good faith. Since the plan to feed cattle is impermissible and not feasible, the court does not need any additional analysis to deny the Debtor’s motion to use cash collateral. Lastly the court looks at the Creditor’s motion for relief of stay. The Debtors argue that the remaining proceeds are necessary for reorganization. The plan presented with those funds, impermissibly substituted the Creditors. Further the court does not see any way the funds could be utilized in reorganization that would be permissible. In re Fuelling, No. 18-00644, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1379 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa May 1, 2019).

Posted June 29, 2019

Sale of FSA Collateral Without Notice Results in Non-Dischargeable Proceeds. The Farm Service Agency FSA attached itself as a creditor in the debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. In March of 2016 the debtor took out two FSA loans for a total of $50,000. A security agreement was also executed at the same time granting the FSA a security interest in "All farm equipment . . . and inventory, now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor, together with all replacements, substitutions, additions, and accessions thereto, including but not limited to the following which are located in the State of Alabama." A specific list of assets was attached, including a New Holland tractor, ten beef breeding cows, and nine calves. The debtor used the loan proceeds to purchase the equipment and livestock that was listed as collateral. In June of the same year, the debtor was notified that she could not have cattle on the land she purchased with another loan not at issue in the case. However, the debtor was never notified of the restriction and it was not stated in the purchase contracts. Ultimately, the debtor was given thirty days to vacate the premises. Around this time, the debtor’s equipment and cattle started to go missing. The debtor was also becoming aware that her boyfriend (and father of her children) had a drug problem, and she began to suspect that he was selling the equipment and cattle for drugs. Later, the debtor attempted to stop a man from taking cattle from the property and the man said to take it up with her boyfriend. The debtor did not report the cattle or equipment as stolen. The debtor’s boyfriend was arrested about the same time for drug crimes and eluding the police. The debtor vacated the property with the only collateral remaining at the property being the New Holland tractor, which the debtor listed for sale on Facebook. The debtor testified that she sold the New Holland tractor to an unknown purchaser for between $6,000.00 and $8,000.00. But the exact price and identity of the purchaser could not be found as the debtor deleted her Facebook account. The proceeds of the tractor sale were put towards bail money for the boyfriend. The debtor never made a payment on the loans and vacated the property before the first payment was due. The FSA attempted to recover the tractor but was unsuccessful. The FSA sought to have the bankruptcy court find the debt owed to the FSA in the amount of $52,048.56 plus interest to be non-dischargeable for fraud; fiduciary defalcation; embezzlement; and willful and malicious injury. The court averaged the alleged selling price of the tractor and rendered $7,000 non-dischargeable. The court also determined that the debtor did not fraudulently obtain the FSA loans, and did not embezzle the collateral because fraud wasn’t present. Because willful and malicious injury was present upon the debtor’s sale of the tractor without notice to the FSA and use of the proceeds for the debtor’s personal benefit, the $7,000 that the debtor received upon sale of the tractor was non-dischargeable. In re Reid, 598 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2019).

Debtor Can’t Convert To Chapter 12. The debtor is a dairy operating as a limited liability partnership (LLP). The LLP filed Chapter 11 in late 2016. At the time the Chapter 11 petition was filed, the debtor was ineligible to file Chapter 12 because aggregate debts exceeded the limit for Chapter 12 eligibility. The bankruptcy court approved the debtor’s reorganization plan in mid-2018. The debtor became unable to make plan payments and the committee of unsecured creditors motioned for the appointment of a liquidating trustee. The debtor objected on the basis that the sale of any assets would trigger capital gain taxes, and the combination of those taxes, the liquidating trustee’s fees, attorney fees and committee attorney fees would completely consume the sale proceeds of the encumbered real estate, farm equipment and cattle rendering the estate insolvent. The debtor then claimed that total debts had fallen beneath the debt limit for a Chapter 12 filing and sought to convert the Chapter 11 case to Chapter 12. Doing so would allow the debtor to take advantage of a favorable tax provision allowing capital gain taxes to be treated as an unsecured claim. The committee of unsecured creditor asserted the non-priority treatment of capital gain taxes was a non-issue because the debtor, as a pass-through entity, had no liability for any taxes. Instead, it would be the partners of the LLP that would have personal liability for taxes arising from asset sales. The debtor claimed it could elect to be taxed as a corporation via IRS Form 8832 upon making an election. Doing so, the debtor claimed, would result in the capital gain taxes being discharged as an unsecured claim. The committee claimed that the debtor is ineligible to convert to Chapter 12 because it was ineligible at the time the petition was filed. The bankruptcy court agreed – the original petition date of the debtor’s Chapter 11 filing is the date for measuring the debtor’s eligibility under Chapter 12, at which time the debtor was ineligible for Chapter 12. The bankruptcy court also pointed out that the debtor’s bankruptcy filing does not impact the debtor’s tax status. The bankruptcy court determined that allowing the debtor to now make an election to be treated for tax purposes as a corporation would violate the absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B) – a mainstay of Chapter 11. The absolute priority rule bars a court from approving a plan that gives a holder of a claim anything unless objecting classes have been paid in full. Thus, the proposed conversion of tax status would dilute the class of unsecured creditors and shift unfavorable tax treatment to the detriment of creditors. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined that the proposed tax election was not in the best interests of the debtor, the bankruptcy estate or the creditor and denied the tax election. The bankruptcy court approved the appointment of a liquidating trustee. In re Schroeder Bros. Farms of Camp Douglas LLP, No. 16-13719-11, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1705 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. May 30, 2019).

Posted May 25, 2019

Chapter 12 Plan Not Feasible. A father/son partnership farming operation filed for bankruptcy. In their reorganization plan, they valued their farm equipment at $393,000 and proposed to pay the debt  in semi-annual payments at 5.75 % over seven years. The creditor bank claimed that the equipment was worth $411,000. As for the farmland, the debtor valued a tract at $280,000 ($2,523/acre) and the bank valued it at $3,000/acre. The debtor’s plan proposed to pay off the debt over 30 years. The plan also accounts for cash leases of the land to be granted to a granddaughter/daughter. The granddaughter maintains her own separate cow herd and has her own FSA loans on equipment. The granddaughter made projections on a cotton crop for the 2019 growing season, which the farming operation has never planted. The cash in the plan is based off the granddaughter’s projections for cropping and leasing. The bank claimed that the projections were not feasible and the court denied confirmation, but granted the debtor 21 days to submit a second amended plan. In denying confirmation of the proposed plan, the court noted that the bank was undersecured and that the treatment of the bank’s claim was insufficient. The plan does provide for all of the secured creditor’s claims; the plan does fail to meet the statutory requirements on the bank’s liens. In addition, the plan did not account for the equipment lien of $114,000, and there was no evidence by either party as to what the average length of the loans and interest rate should be – there was merely a request by the debtors to set the length of the loans for 30-years. On the feasibility issue, the court noted that the proposed plan was based off the granddaughter’s management and was not supported by any historical data. The granddaughter’s involvement in the operation had not been memorialized in a lease or management agreement. While the court noted that the granddaughter was significantly involved in the farming operation, the plan seemed to be replacing the debtors with her. While this is permissible in a Chapter 12, it did create some insecurity in the creditor. In addition, there was no historical data with debtors concerning production of cotton to support the plan’s projections. Thus, the plan was denied and the second amended plan should account for the higher equipment lien value and be based historical cropping yield and expense data. In re Graves Farms, No. 18-10893, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 977 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2019).

Posted April 6, 2019

Auto Body Shop Included in Rural Homestead Exemption. The debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in 2008 claiming their home and the property on which their auto body business was located as an exempt rural homestead. The bankruptcy trustee and a creditor objected to the inclusion of the auto body shop property as part of the homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court denied the objection, noting that state (TX) law defines exempt rural property as, “The homestead, not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than two hundred acres of land, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon . . .”. The rural homestead was also defined further as, “If used for the purposes of a rural home, the homestead shall consist of: (1) for a family, not more than 200 acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon . . .” Thus, the court reasoned, a separate, non-continuous parcel may be a part of the homestead if it is presently used to support the family. Future intention to use the property to support the family is not enough. In addition, the burden is on the debtor to prove the nexus between the two separate properties. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined that the body shop was exempt rural homestead property because it supported the family and was in a rural area. In addition, the debtors proved the nexus of the auto body shop property to their residence by establishing that it was utilized to make repairs to personal vehicles and the residence property. In addition, the bankruptcy court noted that the body shop property contained a kitchen, bathroom, and other home-like amenities. In re Pool, No. 18-11052-hcm, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 720 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2019).

Chapter 12 Proposed Plan Must Be Amended. The debtors filed Chapter 12 and proposed a five-year reorganization plan that would distribute farming assets to a trust for payment of unsecured creditors that remained unpaid after completion of payments under the plan. The debtors would serve as trustees and would farm with the trust property. After the five-year term of the trust, the remaining unsecured creditors would be paid, the trust would dissolve, and the balance of the trust property would return to the debtors. The bankruptcy trustee objected, and the court upheld the objection noting that the proposal impermissibly extended the time period for repayment under Chapter 12. However, the court allowed the debtors’ proposed repayment of student loans that allowed the payments to be directed towards principal first. The court gave the debtors’ 21 days to amend their plan to account for the repayment of unsecured creditors. In re Duensing, No. 18-10201, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 598 (Bankr. D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2019).

Chapter 12 Plan Not Feasible. The debtor, a farm partnership operated by two brothers, farmed primarily corn and soybeans. The Debtors filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy in early 2018. In May of 2018, the Debtors filed a joint Chapter 12 plan, but the secured creditors, FCMA and FCS, objected. The debtors filed an amended Chapter 12 plan providing FCMA with a fully secured claim of roughly $2.7 million and FCS with a fully secured claim of roughly $180,000. The plan provided for periodic payments funded primarily by the debtor’s farming income and supplemented by custom trucking and combining revenue. Additional funding in the first year would come from crop insurance and anticipated federal aid for farmers affected by political activity upsetting foreign crop sales. The creditors and the Trustee objected to the confirmation of the amended plan on various grounds, but the main argument raised was that the amended plan was not feasible, because the debtor’s one-year income and expense projections were limited and unrealistic compared to the debtor’s historical income and expenses. An evidentiary hearing was held to present projected revenue and expenses for the farm and thus determine the feasibility (whether the debtor could make all plan payments and comply with the plan) of the amended plan. The court analyzed the projected revenues and expenses for the coming year, and the concluded that the plan was not feasible because the debtors had failed to prove that the plan was feasible beyond March 2019. The court stated that if the debtors only had to prove they could make the payments required up to March 2019, the debtors would prevail because the testimony created a reasonable belief that the receipts necessary to make payments up to that time either had or would soon occur. However, beyond March 2019 that was not the case. The court compared the debtors’ projections to calculations using the yield and price per acre that was supported by the record. The record showed that the debtors could only pay anticipated operating expenses and plan payments after March 2019 if the debtor’s unsupported projections were used. The projections using the bushels per acre and price per bushel that are evidenced by the record only showed revenue of $592,000 to $736,000 with expenses of $872,000. Given this lack of ability to pay combined with the debtor’s projections overstating revenue from soybean production during the 2019 crop year the court found that the debtors anticipated receipts simply did not cover the debtors’ obligations to pay operating expenses and plan payments beyond March 2019. Thus, the plan was not feasible and the court denied confirmation of the amended plan. In re Jubilee Farms, 595 B.R. 546, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 4080 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2018).

Posted March 16, 2019

Late-Filed Proof of Claim Allowed. The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and submitted a complete list of creditors. One of the creditors did not receive notice of the bankruptcy because of a bad address but became aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy upon attempting to collect on their account after the proof of claim deadline had passed. There were multiple plans submitted to the court that were rejected for various reasons, but every plan submitted accounted for the creditor that did not have notice. Ultimately, the debtor’s plan was confirmed. After confirmation, the creditor attempted to file a proof of claim and the trustee objected. The creditor maintained that it filed as soon as receiving notice of the proceedings. The court allowed the claim, but that the creditor had not established grounds for an extended timeframe to file the proof of claim. Even so, the court noted that the debtor’s initial plan and amended plans all accounted for the creditor’s claim. All the plans were consistent with the creditor’s late-filed proof of claim. Thus, the court confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan with the late-filed proof of claim upon a finding that it was consistent with the plan. In re Wulff, No. 17-31982-bhl, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 388 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2019).

March 12, 2019

Mortgage Renewal Was Not An Advancement. The debtor filed bankruptcy in 2017. At the time of filing, the debtor had a 2006 loan secured by his farmland had matured. Instead of foreclosing, the creditor bank and the debtor negotiated a renewal in 2012. Another creditor, an agricultural cooperative, held a 2009 lien. In determining priority, the court held that the bank’s liens were prior to the cooperative’s liens. The court determined that the 2012 renewal of the bank note, even if the bank new of the cooperative’s lien, did not cause the bank to lose priority. While the court noted that sometimes an advancement on an existing mortgage causes the underlying mortgage to lose priority over subsequent liens, the court determined that the 2012 renewal was not an advancement. There was no evidence that additional funds were loaned to the debtor by the bank. In addition, the court determined that the bank’s lowering of the interest rate on the obligation did not cause the creditor to lose priority. In re Smith, Nos. 17-11591-WRS, 18-1068-WRS, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 234 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2019).

February 17, 2019

Chapter 12 Case Dismissed After Multiple Plans Proposed. The debtor filed Chapter 12. The debtor owed three secured creditors approximately $350,000 in addition to other unsecured creditors. Two of the secured creditors and the trustee objected to the debtor’s proposed reorganization plan. At the September hearing, it was revealed that the debtor had not provided any of the required monthly reports. As a result, the court denied plan confirmation and required the debtor to put together an amended plan. The debtor subsequently submitted multiple amended plans, and all were denied confirmation because of the debtor’s inaccurate financial reporting and miscalculation of income and expense. The current proposed plan was not clear as to how much the largest creditor is to be paid. The creditor had foreclosed, and some payments have been made but the payments were not detailed in the plan. The court denied plan confirmation and denied the debtor’s request to file another amended plan and dismissed the case. The court was not convinced that the debtor would ever be able to put together an accurate and manageable plan that he could comply with, having already had five opportunities to do so. In re Akers, 594 B.R. 362 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2019).

Debtor’s Default on a Post-Petition Crop Loan was Non-Dischargeable. The defendant filed Chapter 11 in 2016. A month after filing bankruptcy, the defendant sought permission to obtain post-petition financing from the plaintiff (an ag lender) in the form of a crop loan to produce and harvest the debtor’s 2016 soybean crop. To obtain the crop loan, the defendants completed a “Crop Loan Application,” and submitted a “Farm List” to the plaintiff. The paperwork listed the acreage and yearly rent prices for each parcel of land the defendant planned on farming during that year. The total acreage listed was well over 8,000 acres. Based on the documentation, the plaintiff approved and made a $1.9 million crop loan. In 2017, the defendant converted the Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case and subsequently defaulted on the crop loan, at a time when the outstanding balance was $378,809.00. The plaintiff sued, claiming that outstanding balance was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B). Under that provision, a creditor seeking to have debt excepted from discharge must establish that the debtor, with intent to deceive, used a materially false written statement to obtain a loan from the creditor and that the creditor reasonably relied on the statement to loan funds to the debtor. The bankruptcy court determined that the Crop Loan Application and the Farm List constituted a written statement, and the fact that the Farm List was not attached to the Crop Loan Application was immaterial. It was more than simply a projection of the acres to be farmed in 2016 - it was a concrete representation of the debtor’s need for $1.9 million. While the documentation indicated that the debtor planned to farm about 8,000 acres, the debtor actually farmed about 5,000 acres and had profit of approximately $1.5 million less than projected in the documentation. Consequently, the bankruptcy court regarded the projected acreage and profit numbers as “substantially untruthful” and “materially false.” The bankruptcy court determined that the there was nothing in the documentation that would have alerted the creditor to the falsity of the information provided, and that the creditor reasonably relied on the information to loan the $1.9 million – an amount necessary for the debtor to plant 8,000 acres. The bankruptcy court also concluded that the debtor had intent to deceive via the false documentation based on the totality of the circumstances including the fact that the debtor had attested that the Farm List was an accurate representation of the amount of land they were going to farm. The bankruptcy court pointed out that the debtor knew that the amount of land actually farmed in the prior year was only 5,200 acres. The bankruptcy court found it inconceivable that the defendants anticipated being able to increase their row crop production by almost 50 percent from the previous year, while being in an active bankruptcy case. Consequently, the remaining balance of the loan was not dischargeable. In re Blankenship, No. 16-10839, No. 17-5098, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 7 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Jan. 2, 2019).

February 10, 2019

Family Fight Involving Farm Transition. The decedent’s estate plan provided for the decedent’s grandson to continue farming the decedent’s land after the decedent died. Since 2009, the grandson farmed the decedent’s land in accordance with a lease the decedent entered into with the decedent’s daughter. Accordingly, the grandson and his mother (the decedent’s daughter) were named beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate, which included a Farm Family Trust. The decedent’s will, executed in 2010, appointed the daughter as trustee of the trust and the grandson as successor trustee. The lease was renewed in 2011 on the condition that the grandson became the primary operator of all farming operations. The decedent died in 2012. The trust provided that the grandson would receive two-thirds of trust income if he were operating the farm , and his mother would receive one-third. In the daughter’s 2011 divorce proceedings she stipulated that her son was performing all of the farming tasks. However, she did not release the two-thirds of trust income to her son and filed an eviction action against him. The trial court determined that the son was owed $340,928 and removed his mother as trustee. Ultimately, the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but during the appeal the mother filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The son filed a proof of claim in his mother’s bankruptcy estate for approximately $630,000, which included the original amount the trial court awarded plus interest to the time the automatic stay was imposed, plus an amount for fixtures he claimed that his mother removed from the farm, costs incurred for financing to farm the land and almost $200,000 in post-judgment attorney’s fees. The bankruptcy court awarded him $41,300 for damages for the mother’s removal of farm property less a nominal amount for his violation of the automatic stay. However, the court denied his claim for $44,700 attributable to the costs of financing equipment as "duplicative of the amounts the court has allowed for damages he suffered as a result of the improper removal of trust property by [him]" and did not find any basis to award the requested attorney's fees. On further review, the federal district court affirmed. The mother appealed the part of the judgment against her for damages attributable to the removal of farm property. The federal district court, on appeal, determined that the son had standing because he established that he sustained personal damages by his mother’s actions as administrator of the decedent’s estate and trustee of the Family Farm Trust. The court upheld the damage award for the mother’s removal of farm property, upheld the denial of an award for attorney’s fees and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment in all other respects. Kile v. Kendall, No. 2:17-CV-373-RMP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209043 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018).

November 19, 2018

IRS Lien Not Eliminated by Bankruptcy Filing. The defendants had unpaid taxes and the IRS assessed a deficiency and penalties and filed Notices of Federal Tax Liens with the local county with respect to the defendants’ property in that county. The defendants then filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court granted an Order of Discharge. The defendants chose the state (MA) bankruptcy exemptions and claimed a $500,000 homestead exemption which allowed them to exempt up to $500,000 of value from certain creditor liens and enforcement actions. The IRS sued to enforce the tax liens by selling the defendants’ property. The defendants claimed that the enforcement of the liens was barred because the property subject to the liens was exempt property in the bankruptcy estate. The trial court disagreed, holding that the state bankruptcy code exemption has no effect on the enforceability of federal tax liens citing as authority United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983) and United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). The defendants also claimed that the court’s Order of Discharge barred the foreclosure sale. Again, the trial court disagreed. The trial court noted that the filing of Chapter 7 does not render the federal tax liens unenforceable but may relieve the debtor of personal liability. However, the trial court denied the motion of the IRS for partial final judgment because the trial court had not yet made findings concerning the order of priorities for distribution of sale proceeds. United States v. Seeley, No. 16-cv-10935-ADB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191082 (D. Mass. Nov. 8, 2018).

November 4, 2018

Debtor Is “Farmer” Entitled to Tools-of-Trade Exemption. Before filing Chapter 12, the debtors, a married couple, significantly reduced the scale of their farming operation. Upon filing Chapter 12, the debtors claimed the Kansas exemption for tools of the trade contained in Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-2304(e). The debtors’ lender (a bank) objected to the exemption on the basis that the debtors had so significantly reduced their farming operations that they were no longer “farmers” as their primary occupation or that they were only entitled to a percentage of the exemption. The husband debtor had farmed since 1948 and his wife began working exclusively on the farm in 2007. The bank agreed that if the husband was entitled to the exemption his wife was also. The debtors’ homestead consisted of 17 acres, and the debtors used a portion of it to raise a forage crop for livestock and another portion was used as a hay meadow for livestock grazing. The husband debtor was also the beneficiary of three tracts of land held in trusts established by his parents consisting of almost 500 acres that were a mixture of row crop, hay meadow, pasture and CRP ground. The debtor, via the trust instrument, was responsible for managing those properties. The bank financed the debtors’ farming operations and when the loans matured in late 2017 the bank sought payment. The debtors’ filed Chapter 12 and proposed to pay the loan by retiring from farming and generate funds from the sale of certain equipment. At the time of filing, the debtors were no longer row crop farming but were continuing to care for cattle on the trust properties and manage the CRP acres. Some of the trust properties were rented out, with the debtors maintaining fences and providing nutrients and care for the tenants’ cattle. The debtors also planted fall crops to feed to their own cattle and horses. The debtors inspected the trust lands twice weekly and controlled weeds on the CRP ground and maintained brush control. Their proposed reorganization plan estimated their monthly net farm income as $978.98 and they projected their annual gross farm income to be $21,364 with $20,800 consisting of farm rental income. The debtors testified to the value of the items of personal property that they were claiming as tools of the trade, and the total claimed value did not exceed the statutorily allowed amount. The court noted that the debtors retained only those farming assets that were necessary to the continuation of their reduced-scale farming operation and turned over other assets to the bank. The debtors also proposed to retain four non-exempt tractors by paying the bank their value in ten semi-annual installments, with interest. The court noted that eligibility for the exemption was to be determined as of the date of filing. As the court pointed out, that’s different than a debtor being eligible for Chapter 12 – which is based on debt and income in the year preceding filing (or the second and third years back). The court also pointed out that the only issues for consideration as to eligibility for the exemption was whether the debtors were engaged in the farming business, and whether the claimed exempt items were regularly and reasonably necessary in carrying on that business. While the court noted that the debtors were no longer engaged in planting and harvesting crops, as of the date the Chapter 12 petition was filed, the court determined that the debtors were engaged in ranching and other farming activities such as cattle grazing, harvesting hay and planting forage crops to feed cattle and horses. The court noted that the debtors also maintained the farmland in the trusts and managed the 3-5 acres of CRP ground. The court specifically noted that while the debtors did not have most of their income come from farming, the tools of the trade exemption does not require that farming be the exclusive or sole means generating income. The court also noted that the exemption does not require the tools to be used on land the debtor farms for himself (crop/livestock share leases are permissible as is managing CRP ground) or produce something for sale. The court also rejected the bank’s argument that the debtors couldn’t claim the exemption because they had quit farming as of the time they filed for Chapter 12 as contrary to the evidence. The court noted that the debtors had at least temporarily retired from crop farming, but not from ranching and caring for agricultural land as indicated by the retention of some equipment essential to continuing the ranching and ag land maintenance activities. In addition, the court noted that the debtors’ proposed budget that showed only social security benefits and retirement benefits along with land rent was consistent with the debtors’ testimony that they were reducing their farming activities. The court determined that the debtors were still engaged in the trade or business of farming as of the petition date. However, the court determined that five of the claimed horses were not eligible for the exemption as nonessential to the continuation of the debtors’ farming activities. The court noted that the bank’s objection to the valuation of the exempt assets would be determined in a separate proceeding unless the parties came to an agreement. In re Rudolph, No. 18-40423, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 3328 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2018).

October 19, 2018

Debtor Can Convert Chapter 12 Case to Chapter 11. The debtor, an elderly widowed woman, owns three tracts of farmland that she leases out for farming purposes that serve as collateral for loans taken out by her children and grandchildren. The debtor sued a bank and the spouse of a granddaughter for “improprieties on the loans and liens.” The debtor filed Chapter 12, but the bank moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the debtor was not a ‘family farmer.” The debtor then moved to convert the case to Chapter 11. The bank objected, claiming that a Chapter 12 case cannot be converted to a Chapter 11. While the court noted that there is some authority for that proposition, the court also noted that there is no explicit statutory language that bars a Chapter 12 from being converted to a Chapter 11 and that the courts are split on the issue. Ultimately, the court concluded that 11 U.S.C. §1208(e) allowed for conversion if the proceeding was in good faith and conversion would not be inequitable or prejudicial to creditors. The court also noted that if it dismissed the debtor’s Chapter 12, case, the debtor could simply refile the matter as a Chapter 11 case. The court saw no point in requiring that procedural step as there was no explicit statutory language requiring dismissal and refiling. The court also noted that upon conversion the automatic stay would remain in place, and that the debtor would actually have a more difficult time getting her reorganization plan confirmed as part of a Chapter 11 case as compared to a Chapter 12 case. In re Cardwell, No. 17-50307-rlj12, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 3089 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2018).

October 6, 2018

Multi-Entity Family Farming Operation’s Chapter 12 Plan Not Feasible. The Debtor, CF Beef & Grain, LLC, filed Chapter 12. The three members of CF Beef, David J. and Patricia Clark, and one of their sons, Gregory J. Clark, were also the only members of another entity (entity), CF Ag Services, LLC. David and Patricia Clark, and their son Greg each filed individual Chapter 7 cases before the debtor filed Chapter 12. Numerous creditor object to the Chapter 12 reorganization plan. The debtor filed an amended plan which prompted another round of similar objections. The trustee also filed an objection and requested dismissal. The debtor’s plan projections relied on four different sources of income: crop income; agricultural program payments; cash infusions from CF Ag; and income from custom drying and storing grain. The debtor’s anticipated crop income of approximately $654,000 in 2018 was based primarily on sales of corn. The debtor anticipated selling 100,440 bushels, mainly to ethanol plants, at $3.75 per unit. However, several people testified that the price of corn was down and that the sale price of $3.75 on which the debtor’s 2018 crop income was based would not be possible until early in 2019. In addition, the members of the entity rented approximately 300 acres of land that they personally owned to the debtor at no charge. All of the land had outstanding debt and was subject to foreclosure via the members’ individual Chapter 7 cases. Thus, if foreclosure resulted, the debtor would have about 300 fewer acres with which to generate crop revenue. The members were advised to spread their overall risk, and so, through the entity, they conducted planting, tillage, combining, chopping, grain trucking, and livestock trucking for others. The entity uses some equipment that the debtor owns. As compensation for that use, as well as for some land leases, “funds are infused back.” The Chapter 12 plan projected that the entity would pay the debtor $125,000 yearly, but was not on pace to accomplish that goal, and there was no written contract that committing the entity to make payments to the debtor. The court determined that the evidence concerning entity’s ability to make annual cash infusions of $125,000 to fund the debtor’s plan was troubling. According to the court, the larger problem with the entity’s “infusing funds back” to the debtor was the fact that the entity also had an outstanding loan of $142,000 to the Bank, which was in default. The plan required the debtor to make yearly payments of at least $297,979.53 to the Chapter 12 trustee, beginning on December 31, 2018. Of this amount, $125,000 will come from the entity as a “cash infusion.” However, the court determined that the evidence did not support the entity’s ability to make these payments to the debtor. The bigger problem, according to the court, was that the entity’s cash infusions to the Debtor would come at the bank’s expense. In addition, the possibility of losing 300 acres which the debtor used rent-free was a major concern for the court. Taking all these factors together, the Court held that the Debtor failed to show that the plan was feasible. In addition, the court noted that a confirmable Chapter 12 plan must comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) by being in the best interest of the creditors and provide them with at least as much as they would receive if the debtor liquidated. After reviewing the liquidation analyses of the debtor, as well as the testimony and arguments at the confirmation hearing, it the court could not conclude that the debtor had met this burden. In addition, the court determined that the failure to prepare for the foreclosure contingencies—or at least credibly explain how the debtor would manage them successfully—was fatal to the debtor’s plan. In addition, according to the court, the hardest hurdle for the debtor to overcome was the plan’s reliance on the cash infusions from the entity. The court dismissed the debtor’s Chapter 12 case. In re CF Beef & Grain, LLC, No. 18-20898-beh, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2837 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. Sept. 18, 2018).

No IRS Priority on Obamacare Penalty Tax. The debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and the IRS claimed priority position with respect to the debtor’s tax liability, including the debtor’s liability for “shared responsibility payment” under I.R.C. §5000 created as part of Obamacare. Under Chapter 13, the debtor’s reorganization plan must provide for the full payment of al claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. §507. Obamacare mandates that individuals obtain health care coverage during the tax year or pay a “shared responsibility payment,” also referred to as the “individual mandate penalty” or the “Roberts tax” (so-named after Chief Justice Roberts that construed the payment as a “tax” so as to uphold the constitutionality of Obamacare in National Federation of Independent. Business. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)). Based on the Supreme Court’s 2012 opinion, the IRS asserted priority over the debtor’s outstanding obligation to make the payment in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8) which affords the IRS priority status to “allowed unsecured claims of governmental units” (including an excise tax on a transaction) on the basis that the payment was an excise tax. The IRS noted that in Sebelius, the Supreme Court noted that the penalty, once imposed, had to be reported on the taxpayer’s return and the IRS had to assess and collect it in the same manner as taxes in general. The debtors objected on the grounds that the payment was not a “tax” that entitled the IRS to priority under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8), but was merely a penalty for failure to obtain the government-mandated health insurance. The court noted that characterizations in the Internal Revenue Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy context, but that an exaction is a tax when it lays a pecuniary burden on an individual or property for the purpose of supporting the government. On that point, the court noted that the “Roberts tax” had been estimated to generate about $4 billion annually by 2017. However, the court noted that the burden of the penalty on any particular person was “light,” contained no “scienter” requirement and the IRS had no criminal enforcement authority to enforce payment. Thus, failure to pay the penalty was not “unlawful.” In addition, the court reasoned that the payment was not a tax on the production or use of goods, but was a penalty imposed for doing nothing in terms of health insurance (note: the court glossed over the point that a penalty imposed on persons that self-insure is a “tax” in every sense of the word to those persons). Thus, it was a penalty on a condition or status rather than an activity. Accordingly, the penalty could not be an excise tax because it wasn’t imposed on the enjoyment of a privilege (although being free to self-insure is a privilege that such persons enjoy). The court was not willing to take an expansive view of the definition of an excise tax. In addition, the court noted that 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(E)(8) requires that an excise tax be imposed on a transaction for the IRS to have priority. However, the court concluded, the penalty was triggered not on a transaction, but on the lack of a transaction. Thus, the court disallowed as a priority unsecured claim the IRS claim attributable to the debtor’s outstanding “shared responsibility payment” imposed under I.R.C. §5000A in the amount of $1,043, plus $9.18 in interest. The court allowed the claim as a nonpriority unsecured claim. In so holding, the court followed the precedent set forth in In re Parrish, 583 B.R. 873 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2018) and In re Chesteen, No. 17-11472, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 360, 2018 WL 878847 (Bankr. E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2018). In re Huenerberg, No. 17-28645, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2992 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. Sept. 28, 2018).

September 29, 2018

Fully Encumbered Assets Can’t Be Fraudulently Transferred. The decedent owned a farm and a corporation. The farm filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy, and on the day the bankruptcy petition was filed, $250,000 of equipment was transferred from the corporation to the farm via a bill of sale for no consideration. A bank served as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate and sought to set aside the equipment transfer as a fraudulent attempt to hide assets and moved for summary judgment. The court rejected the motion, noting that the equipment was transferred to consolidate the Chapter 12 proceeding into a single farm. The court also noted that the equipment was fully encumbered by a lien in the bank’s favor. Thus, there was no attempt to frustrate the bank’s right to collect indebtedness. In addition, under the state (IA) Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), fully encumbered assets did not meet the statutory definition of an “asset” that could be “transferred” under the UFTA. Thus, the UFTA did not apply. In re W. Slopes Farms Partnership, Nos. 17-00699, 17-09047, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2742 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018).

September 8, 2018

IRS Liable For Emotional Distress Damages For Harassing Taxpayers. The debtors filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in late 2012, thereby putting in place the automatic stay. The IRS was notified of the bankruptcy filing, but in late 2013 the IRS sent the first of four notices to the debtors demanding payment and threatening imminent enforcement action, including a levy on the debtors’ Social Security benefits. The IRS sent the same letter three more times during 2014. Each time the IRS violated the automatic stay. The debtors sued the IRS for violation of the automatic stay and damages for emotional distress caused by the threatening letters. The IRS conceded that its conduct violated the automatic stay, but asserted that it was immune from suit for emotional distress damages. The bankruptcy court disagreed with the IRS and awarded the debtors $4,000 in damages for emotional distress. On appeal, the trial court reversed. The trial court held that sovereign immunity was not waived under 11 U.S.C. §362(k) (the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code), and dismissed the case. On further review, the appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court. The appellate court noted that the Congress had enacted several broad waivers of the United States’ sovereign immunity, and that the waiver at issue in the case, 11 U.S.C. §106(a), applied to 59 provisions of the bankruptcy code. One of those enumerated provisions involves the automatic stay provision which specifies that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay…shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and…punitive damages.” In a prior decision, the appellate court noted, it had held that “actual damages” under the automatic stay provision included damages for emotional distress. The appellate court held that the scope of waiver provision in 11 U.S.C. §106(a) was unambiguous and included emotional distress damages under 11 U.S.C. §362(k) that are monetary damages. Immunity is not waived, however, for punitive damages. An award of emotional distress damages, the court held is an “order or judgment awarding a money recovery…”. Thus, they were a court-ordered recovery of money damages that are compensatory damages and were not punitive damages. The appellate court rejected the IRS’ contention that “money recovery” referred only to claims seeking to restore to the bankruptcy estate sums of money unlawfully in the possession of governmental entities as implausible based on the text 11 U.S.C. §106(a)(3). The appellate court also rejected the reasoning of the First Circuit in an analogous case, In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005), based on the plain text of 11 U.S.C. §106(a). Hunsaker v. United States, No. 16-35991, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24721 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018).

August 29, 2018

Court Utilizes Multi-Factor Test To Determine When Bankrupt Debtor Can Make Direct Creditor Payments Under Plan. The debtor filed Chapter 12 in mid-2016 and a reorganization plan later that year. The plan called for direct payments to the secured creditors but payments to the unsecured creditors would be made to the Trustee for distribution. The Trustee objected, but the court upheld the direct payments except as applied to one secured creditor based on the application of a 13-factor test. In balancing the factors, the court weighed the necessary compensation for the Trustee against a feasible plan for the debtor. The court noted that the debtor had used the bankruptcy process to substantially modify one secured creditor’s claim and, as a result, had to pay that creditor’s claim through the Trustee. The other secured creditors, the court noted, remained mostly unaffected by the debtor’s bankruptcy. In re Speir, No. 16-11947-JDW, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2359 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2018).

August 5, 2018

Cash Collateral Account Not Part of Bankruptcy Estate. The debtors, a married couple, owned a farm structured as an LLC and an agribusiness company. One of them also was a 50% owner in another LLC. All of entities are involved in the farming. The debtors filed a Chapter 12 petition, and a week after filing they filed a motion to use cash collateral of $47,090 to buy inputs for the 2017 crop. The cash collateral to be used included uncashed checks that had First Trust and Savings Bank (bank) as a co-payee. The bank, a secured creditor, objected to the motion. The bank asserted that the non-debtor farm LLC owned the cash collateral and it was not property of the debtor’s estate. The court granted the use of cash collateral up to $9,000 for living expenses and $6,000 for farming expenses. The court made it clear this order was not an adjudication, resolution, or waver on the objections or the rights or priorities of the secured creditors. Six months later the debtors filed an amended motion. This amendment sought to use $93,798 total from un-negotiated checks and the 2016 soybean crop payment. These checks had been deposited into the account created by the previous order. The bank again objected for the same reason as the last objection. At trial there was evidence presented that there was about $101,000 in the cash collateral account. About $68,000 of that amount was from crops harvested during the bankruptcy, with the balance of the funds in the account arising from pre-filing transactions. The debtors claimed that while the funds once belonged to the farms, when they were deposited into the account they became the property of the debtor’s estate. Also, the debtors claimed that as owners of the farm, they could make distributions to themselves. The court framed the issue as one of whether the cash collateral account was more like an escrow account or a checking account, noting that the debtors’ use of the account required the bankruptcy estate to have an interest in the account. The burden was on the debtors to establish that the account was property of the bankruptcy estate. The court determined that there was a lack of proof that the account funds were part of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the funds could not be used for farming expenses for use by the other LLC in which one of the debtors had an interest. In re Packer, No. 17-81746, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2143 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 19, 2018).

July 4, 2018

Relief From Stay In Collection Action Caused By Bankruptcy Of Debtor Is Granted. The debtor filed Chapter 12 on December 22, 2010. A plan was filed on August 18, 2011 and was confirmed on April 13, 2012. On December 13, 2017, the Chapter 12 trustee filed a motion to deem the Chapter 12 plan completed and to allow a refund to the debtor of an overpayment of $2,031.07. An order allowing the motion was filed on March 13, 2018, but the case has not been closed. Hitchcock Inc. filed a motion on March 5, 2018. It alleges that on January 28, 2014, Hitchcock sold a manure box and components to the debtor for a truck owned, leased, or used by debtor. The purchase price was $55,680.00. The debtor failed to pay Hitchcock. Not knowing that the debtor had filed a bankruptcy proceeding, on February 19, 2016, Hitchcock filed a collection action against debtor to recover $41,652.40, the amount then alleged to be due, plus costs, reasonable attorney fees, and interest. A mediation and settlement meeting was held. The debtor claimed that an oral agreement had been reached that the debtor would pay Hitchcock $22,000. The debtor first advised Hitchcock of his bankruptcy case at the end of the settlement meeting or shortly thereafter. The state court judge then stayed the collection action pending a ruling as to whether the case could proceed. Hitchcock's sought relief from the stay to continue the collection action to judgment and to allow execution on any judgment in its favor, including assets that are or were property of the bankruptcy estate. In the alternative, Hitchcock alleged that the equipment sold to the debtor was a necessary cost and expense of preserving the bankruptcy estate and its claim should be allowed as an administrative expense incurred while the bankruptcy case was pending. The debtor disputed the amount alleged to be owed, and denied that Hitchcock's claim should be allowed as an administrative expense due to failure of Hitchcock to comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §364(b) and § 503 The debtor also opposed relief from stay on the ground that the debtor, who resides in Offerle, Kansas, would be placed at a significant geographical advantage if required to litigate in Colorado. The Court found that Hitchcock should be granted relief from stay for cause, as allowed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) because Hitchcock had not been granted adequate protection, and such protection had not been offered. In addition, debtor did not seek court approval before he obtained debt other than in the ordinary course of his farming operation as required by 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) and debtor did not advise Hitchcock that he was the debtor in an open bankruptcy case until about two years after the collection action was filed. The court noted that debtor's bankruptcy case was ready to be closed, and determined that there was no benefit in holding it open for the purpose of resolving Hitchcock's claim. The court also found that allowing the collection action to proceed would not put debtor at a significant geographical disadvantage, since Kit Carson County Colorado (the location of the court) was the first county west of Kansas when traveling on I-70 westbound from Kansas and multiple court appearances should not be necessary. The court therefore held that Hitchcock should be granted relief from stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) for cause. The court also determined that Hitchcock may continue the collection action pending in the Colorado to judgment, and if judgment was entered in Hitchcock's favor, Hitchcock may execute on debtor's assets, including those that are or were property of the bankruptcy estate. In re Hornung, No. 10-14263 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1391 (Banrkr. D. Kan. May 8, 2018).

Liquidation Services Not Within The Scope of Farm Manager’s Duty. On April 13, 2017, the debtor and its sole member-manager filed Chapter 12. petitions. The debtor was removed as a debtor in possession on November 8, 2017, and an order was entered authorizing the trustee to operate the debtor’s farming operations and perform all duties of a debtor in possession. On November 14, 2017, the trustee filed an ex parte application to appoint a farm manager. The trustee, and several creditors and employees of the dairy (employee-creditors) entered into a stipulation, providing for the duties of the farm manager and capping her fees at $75,000. The court then entered an “Order Authorizing Trustee to Employ Farm Manager.” On November 29, 2017, the trustee filed an ex parte application to employ a dairy consultant. An order approving the application was entered on November 30, 2017. The dairy consultant’s rate was set at $125 per hour. On December 20, 2017, the trustee filed a motion on shortened time to increase the farm manager's fee cap from $75,000 to $140,000. The employee-creditors filed a response in support, and an order was entered granting the trustee's motion on January 5, 2018. Orders were also entered on January 5, 2018, consolidating the debtors' cases and directing joint administration, and confirming the Chapter 12 trustee's plan of liquidation that was adopted and joined by the debtors. The stated purpose of the confirmed plan "is to liquidate the property of the debtor and Jerry Foster, and to provide a method of orderly payment.” On March 7, 2018, the trustee filed an application for compensation of farm manager and an application for compensation of dairy consultant. The Court reviewed the application and entered an order approving the dairy consultant's application on April 6, 2018. The farm manager seeks approval of $126,500.00 in fees and $2,106.37 in costs, for total compensation of $128,606.37. However, the court noted that despite a lack of objections, it still has an independent duty to examine and approve professional fees and expenses. The court’s primary concern was whether the farm manager should be compensated from the bankruptcy estate as an administrative claimant for services related to the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. The court noted that the trustee is a standing trustee entitled to a fixed percentage in compensation and cannot delegate her statutory duties. Therefore, a professional may not be compensated out of the estate assets for performing what are essentially trustee duties because the trustee already receives a set statutory fee for such services. The farm manager recognized that her role was to oversee the farm and manage all of its operations and to manage the finances and make decisions on operating and employment matters. She further acknowledges that the dairy consultant was hired to assist with liquidating the livestock and caring for the animals. Therefore, the court held that liquidation services were, therefore, not within the scope of the farm manager’s employment. The farm manager argues, however, without any further explanation that by mid-December, the dairy consultant was not spending much time on the actual liquidation of the herd. However, no explanation was given for the change in the dairy consultant’s duties, neither the Court nor the creditors were advised of any such change, no amendment was made to the farm manager's duties, and the dairy consultant’s time records indicated that he continued to work during the time in question. Consequently, the court determined that the dairy consultant’s decreased liquidation role did not authorize the farm manager to perform such services without first seeking court approval. The court, therefore, disallowed certain fees for services directly related to liquidation of estate assets. The court also disallowed certain other fees in the farm manager’s application for payment because they were unreasonable or outside the scope of her employment. As such, the court granted the “Application for Compensation of Farm Manager” in part and the requested compensation was improved in the amount of $112,806.37. In re Southbank Dairies, LLC, No. 17-41467 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1219 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2018).

June 16, 2018

Bank Adequately Protected and Oversecured – Cash Collateral Order For 45 Days Entered. The debtor, a commercial cattle feedlot, bills its customers, the owners of the cattle, for yardage and feed and other expenses each month. The debtor filed for bankruptcy on March 23, 2018, at a time it owed a bank approximately $2.3 million. The bank held a blanket security interest in the debtor’s assets. The debtor listed the value of the assets subject to the bank’s security interest at $2.7 million. The debtor sought permission to use the bank’s cash collateral to continue its operation. The debtor and the bank entered into a temporary cash collateral agreement, and the debtor sought a permanent cash collateral order that would allow the debtor to use feed payments from farmers to be used to pay several elevators and other suppliers in a total amount of $165,221.52. The debtor proposed paying the bank any funds it receives for silage or grain sales out of its existing inventory. The debtor also proposed to pay the bank $7,000 per month as adequate protection. The debtor had customer checks on hand totaling $190,440.43 and billings for the current month of $43,445.06. The debtor first claimed that the portion of the customer checks on hand that is for feed is essentially money set aside to pay the elevators that supplied the grain. The debtor claimed those funds were not the bank's cash collateral, and that the debtor could use portions of the checks that represent feed payments to pay grain elevators without getting the bank's permission. The bank claimed that the funds in question were its cash collateral and that the debtor had not shown, and could not show, that the debtor could adequately protect the bank. However, the court refused to determine the issue of whether the money for feed was the bank’s collateral and chose to determine the case based on the bank’s other argument, lack of adequate protection provided by the $7,000 monthly payments. The court concluded, based on the record, that the bank was over secured by at least $300,000. In addition, the court found no substantial risk that the bank's collateral's value would drop significantly or that the Bank's equity cushion would be in jeopardy for the limited duration of the cash collateral order. In fact, the amount that the debtor requested was less than the equity cushion. The court also found that the debtor's proposed $7,000 monthly payment to ensure the bank is adequately protected compensated the bank for the reduction of its equity position by debtor's use of cash collateral. The debtor also proposed that additional revenue be provided to the bank in the way of silage and corn crop sales, and a $500,000 payment from debtor’s grantor, the mother-in-law of the debtor’s owner. Those payment sources provide additional protection for the bank. The court acknowledged that debtor's ability to confirm its plan relied on many "ifs." In particular, whether the debtor could obtain financing to make its rent and plant crops in the spring; whether the debtor could obtain additional customers and cattle; and whether the debtor's guarantor will, in fact, be able to sell her farm and make the proposed $500,000 payment. Nevertheless, the court determined that these “ifs” were not fatal to the debtor’s request to use cash collateral at this early point in the case. The court noted that in reaching this conclusion it has also factored in the fact that the debtor will have a more accurate picture of its ability to reorganize very soon. Either the debtor will get financing for cropland rent it needs within the next month, or it won't. The ability to use cash collateral to pay the elevator, however, improves the debtor's chances of obtaining rent financing and of making a successful attempt at reorganization. Similarly, the farm of the debtor's guarantor was already on the market. Its sale proceeds could be paid to the bank very soon which would significantly reduce the bank's claim and allow the debtor some breathing room in its payments. Finally, testimony showed that the debtor was also able to house more cattle in outdoor pens during the coming summer months. As such, the court held that these facts indicate that, with a little more time, the debtor may be in a much better position. Thus, because the risk to the bank during this time is minimal given its equity position and debtor's proposed payments adequately compensate the bank for any risk that this passage of time will cause, the court allowed the cash collateral order for a limited period of 45 days. In re Grooters Feedlot, No. 18-00356, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1338 (N.D. Iowa May 1, 2018).

May 12, 2018

Bankruptcy Trustee Can’t Undo Wheat Contracts Entered Into Before Bankruptcy Filing. The debtor, a partnership engaged in wheat farming activities, entered into two contracts for the sale of wheat with a grain broker. The contracts called for a total of 10,000 bushels of wheat to be delivered to the broker anytime between June 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014. In return, the debtor was to be paid $6.78/bushel for 5,000 bushels and $7.09/bushel for the other 5,000 bushels for a total price of $69,350. The debtor delivered the wheat in fulfillment of the contracts on July 21, 2014 and August 4, 2014 and received $71,957.10 later in August, in return for a total delivery of 10,813.07 bushels. The debtor subsequently filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 23, 2014 (which was later converted to Chapter 7). The Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid the transfer of the debtor’s wheat crop a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. §547(b) and return the wheat crop to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors. The trial court disagreed with the trustee, noting that 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1) disallowed avoidance of a transfer if it is made in a contemporaneous exchange for new value that the debtor received. The trustee claimed that the transfer of wheat was not contemporaneous because the contract was entered into in May and the wheat was not delivered and payment made until over two months later. However, the trial court determined that the transfer was for new value and payment occurred in a substantially contemporaneous manner corresponding to the delivery of the wheat. Thus, the exception of 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1) applied. The court also noted that the wheat sale contracts were entered into in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business and, thus, also met the exception of 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(2). The debtor and the grain broker had a business history of similar transactions, and the court noted that the trustee failed to establish that the wheat contracts were inconsistent with the parties’ history of business dealings. Rice v. Prairie Gold Farms, No. 2:17CV126 JLH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51678 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 28, 2018).

March 31, 2018

Secured Creditor Not Entitled to Default Rate of Interest; Debtor Can Use Chapter 12. A secured creditor filed an application for post-petition interest and fees. The debtor had executed three notes in favor of the creditor and defaulted on all three notes. The total amount due on the notes was approximately $1.5 million. The notes were secured by the debtor’s farm which was worth $2 million. Thus, the creditor was oversecured. The notes had a contractual default rate of interest specified at 5 percent (contract rate plus 5 percent). While 11 U.S.C. §506(b), specifies that a fully secured creditor is entitled to interest on its claims, the court determined that doesn’t necessarily mean the default rate. Instead, a presumption arises that the contractual rate of interest should be used, but that presumption can be rebutted based on equitable considerations. Here, the court noted, the evidence demonstrated that the evidence showed that the debtor had rebutted the presumption. Using such interest would effectively double the interest rate on each of the three notes. The creditor’s risk of nonpayment has been low throughout the debtor’s bankruptcy case because it is oversecured, and application of the default rate would decrease and possibly eliminate payments to the unsecured creditors. Thus, the secured creditor’s application was denied. In re Perkins, No. 16-10383(1)(12), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 276 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2017). In a related action, a creditor had challenged the debtor’s eligibility for Chapter 12. The bankruptcy court determined that the debtor’s debts did not exceed the aggregate debt limit; the debtor satisfied the farm income requirement of 11 U.S.C. §101(18)(A); and the debtor’s plan was feasible. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court noted that the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules were made in good faith; the debtor’s gross income from the farming partnership exceeded the debtor’s income from all other sources; and the debtor’s income projections under the reorganization plan were based on average yields and obtainable prices for corn and soybean crops, and did not account for a possible wheat crop which had the potential to bring in more income. In re Perkins, No. 17-8001, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 706 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2018), aff’g., 563 B.R. 229 (W.D. Ky. 2016).

March 17, 2018

Chapter 12 Plan Not Confirmed Due To Poor Valuations and Lack of Feasibility. The debtors own and operate a 109-acre blueberry and blackberry farm. The real property on which the farm operates is owned by the debtors individually. The crops are owned by Blues Brothers, LLC whose only members are the debtors. The debtors filed a chapter 12 petition and a reorganization plan, but before the confirmation hearing, the debtors filed a modified chapter 12 plan. In their First Modified plan, the debtors attempted to address the claims of their various creditors, to reduce the secured claim of Farm Credit East (FCE) from $1,663,352.49 to $600,000 and to pay a pro rata distribution to their unsecured creditors. FCE objected to this plan asserting that the debtors undervalued the farm by more than $1.5 million. FCE also claimed that the plan did not provide for full payment of its secured claim and that the debtors had failed to provide proof of sufficient cash flow to meet their burden of proof on feasibility. The debtors subsequently filed another modified plan that was substantially identical to their first modified plan, except that the debtors would contribute additional income. The second modified plan also specified that a relative would contribute funds to cover shortfalls; and that they would defer any allowed compensation to be paid in later years as opposed to immediately upon approval. Before the hearing, the debtors resolved all objections to confirmation except those of FCE and the bankruptcy trustee. The debtors’ expert testified that he arrived at the appraisal value of $600,000 solely based on a comparable sales analysis of 10 agricultural properties that he believed had similar characteristics to the debtors’ blueberry farm. The expert explained that the 10 properties were similar to the subject property, because they were also limited to agricultural use and the quality and quantity of tillable lands were similar to that of the debtors’ blueberry farm. However, the court noted that out of the 10 properties evaluated only one of them was actually a blueberry farm. On the other hand, FCE’s expert testified that her estimation included the value of the blueberry bushes. She explained that because the debtors’ property is an active blueberry farm with mature blueberry bushes, the value of those blueberry bushes, as permanent plantings, must be taken into account to correctly determine the farm’s replacement value. FCE’s expert compared the subject property to sales of other blueberry farms. The court relied on expert testimony to determine that blueberries are a specialized agricultural product and are permanent plantings. As permanent plants, blueberries must reach maturity before a farm can start producing berries than can be sold and this takes several years. As a result, the plants commit the land to that particular use for the economic life of the blueberries. Thus, the court held that it must consider the value the mature permanent plantings contribute to the land. Moreover, because the debtors’ planned on continuing their farm operation, the court determined that it made no sense to suggest that those mature permanent plantings and the debtors’ intended use should be overlooked. Thus, the court held it was not conceivable that the debtors’ real property would be used for anything other than its current use nor any credibly testimony in that regard. As a result, the debtors failed to meet their burden of proving that all the requirements for confirmation had been met. The court dismissed the case. In re Mortellite, No. 17-21818-ABA, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 69 (Bankr. D. N.J. Jan. 11, 2018).

March 11, 2018

Filing Of Five Bankruptcy Petitions Is Not An Attempt To Delay, Hinder Or Defraud Creditor. The debtor first filed a Chapter 12 case on March 5, 1996, but it was dismissed four months later. At that time, Farm Service Agency (FSA) claimed it was owed $170,350.86. A second bankruptcy petition was filed in November of 1996. After the debtor failed to file his Chapter 12 plan, the court granted his request for a voluntary dismissal of the case in May of 1997. In February 2000, the FSA initiated a mortgage foreclosure action against the debtor which prompted the debtor to commence his third bankruptcy case on April 24, 2000. That filing had the effect of staying the foreclosure proceeding. When a payment under the debtor’s reorganization plan became 10 months overdue, FSA obtained an order dismissing the bankruptcy case. FSA subsequently initiated a second mortgage foreclosure action against the debtor on September 19, 2007 and was awarded summary judgment in the amount of $210,276.24 plus continuing interest. The debtor appealed, but the trial court’s decision was affirmed. FSA scheduled a sale of the property and the debtor filed a motion to stay the sale which was denied. The debtor subsequently filed his fourth bankruptcy petition on March 16, 2010, thereby staying the sale. After nearly seven years, the debtor received a discharge in the fourth bankruptcy case. Although the reorganization plan paid out $89,184.96 to FSA, its confirmation depended upon an agreement with FSA to accept payments outside the plan including three annual installments of $21,795 each and a payment of $75,000 from the estate of the debtor’s deceased ex-wife. While FSA received the payments from the ex-wife’s estate they did not receive any of the annual installments. In light of the missed payments, FSA recommenced foreclosure proceedings and scheduled a sale for August 24, 2017. The debtor then filed his fifth bankruptcy petition on August 22, 2017, thereby staying the scheduled sale. FSA brought this action seeking in rem relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B) to pursue a foreclosure sale arguing that the debtor engaged in a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud it by filing five bankruptcy petitions affecting the property over the past 21 years. However, the bankruptcy court disagreed, pointing out that although the debtor’s 2010 case spanned more than six years and involved 11 different plans, the debtor eventually achieved confirmation and obtained a discharge. The court held that this relentless pursuit of a solution stood in stark contrast to other cases where courts found a debtor’s conduct was engaged in to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. Most significantly, the fact that FSA received a substantial payout during the 2010 bankruptcy indicated that the debtor was not trying to defraud them. The balance outstanding on the FSA judgement was nearly 70 percent less than the amount owed when the fourth case was commenced. Thus, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to justify in rem relief. FSA also claimed that the totality of the circumstances established cause to lift the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). However, the court held that the debtor’s failure to maintain adequate insurance to protect the value of the estate was a breach of the debtor’s fundamental obligations. For this reason, the court conditionally granted relief from the stay in favor of FSA. Thus, the burden shifted to the debtor to show that FSA was adequately protected without relief from the stay. The debtor argued that by any reasonable calculation there was a significant equity cushion based on the value of the property. The court determined that with approximately $97,955.91 of debt secured by a non-exempt property value of $222,898, there was an equity cushion of approximately 66 percent. The court held that the size of this equity cushion met the debtor’s burden rebutting the need to lift the stay despite the lack of insurance. Thus, FSA’s Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay was granted in part and denied in part. In re Olayer, 577 B.R. 464 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017).

March 6, 2018

Chapter 12 Case Dismissed As Not Feasible. The debtor is a farmer who primarily raises corn and soybeans. He is also the sole owner of Springbrook Grain Farms, LLC. The debtor filed a Chapter 12 petition on April 25, 2017, and a Chapter 12 plan on August 22, 2017. On September 25, 2017 a bank objected to plan confirmation. The debtor filed an amended Chapter 12 plan on November 3, 2017 and a second amended Chapter 12 plan on December 14, 2017. The amended plan proposed payments of $8,150 per month for 12 months, then $11,700 per month for 36 months, and finally $13,700 per month for 12 months. In total the plan proposed payments of $683,400 over 60 months. The debtor claimed that this would pay the creditors in full. However, the court determined that the debtor’s plan was not feasible. At confirmation, the debtor would be required to immediately pay $67,155.70 to cure defaults on leases to be assumed and $40,000 to another creditor. However, other than vague testimony that funds were available to satisfy the immediate payments to the other creditor, there was no evidence presented that supported any ability to make the lease cure payments. In addition, the evidence to which the debtor pointed supporting his ability to make payments were his tax returns for the years 2012 through 2015. However, those returns also included crop insurance payments which the debtor was no longer eligible to receive. Yet, according to the debtor’s estimates, he would do better in each of the next three years than he did at any time between 2012 and 2015. The court determined that, based on the picture presented by the debtor’s tax returns and testimony, the debtor’s projections were unpersuasive and lacked credibility. The debtor also estimated that his gross income from crop sale would swell over the next three years and that his expenses would be less than any of the last four years. Yet, the debtor offered no explanation for how he arrived at these estimates. The debtor claimed that his expenses would decrease because he was no longer paying for crop insurance. However, that would only lower his expenses by approximately $30,000 and there was no reserve for crop loss in the projections, which had ranged from $39,210 to $274,933 in the past. For these reasons, the court determined that the debtor failed to meet his burden in showing that the plan was feasible. In addition, the debtor’s plan proposed paying the bank’s various secured claims at a 5.5 percent interest rate. The court determined that under Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), the bank was entitled to a “prime-plus” interest rate. Moreover, in the context of chapter 12 cases, the court noted that risk is often heightened due to the unpredictable nature of the agricultural economy. The court found that the interest rate proposed for the bank in the debtor’s plan was inadequate under Till. The court noted that the current national interest rate was 4.5 percent and the debtor proposed the minimum risk adjustment of 1 percent. The fact that the debtor’s tax returns show that he was consistently reporting losses or barely breaking-even in addition to the many other risk factors led the court to hold that the bank would be subject to a significant degree of risk under the plan and that the debtor’s proposed interest rate was insufficient. Finally, the court held that because the debtor’s projections lacked any credibility or support it would be impossible for the debtor to propose a confirmable plan. As such, the court dismissed the case. In re Johnson, No. 17-11448-12, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 74 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. Jan. 12, 2018).

March 5, 2018

Chapter 12 Case Dismissed For Cause. The debtor filed Chapter 12 in late 2017 claiming to be a family farmer with 34 head of cattle. His bankruptcy schedules listed secured debt of approximately $700,000 and unsecured debt of almost $1 million. The debts exceeded the value of the debtor’s assets listed on the bankruptcy schedules. The debtor also reported no gross income from farming in 2017 but claimed to have $10 million of gross income in each of 2015 and 2016. The bankruptcy trustee motioned to dismiss, noting that the trustee refused to testify at the meeting of creditors, refused to provide documents, and refused to answer questions. A secured creditor also sought to have the debtor explain the disappearance of 2,100 head of cattle and other assets worth $550,000 all since the fall of 2017. Various creditors sought to have debts of over $1.1 million declared non-dischargeable based on the debtor’s conduct. The bankruptcy court agreed, noting that the facts did not support conversion to Chapter 7 because the evidence did not show that the debtor had committed fraud in connection with the bankruptcy case (as opposed to fraud in connection with his cattle trading business). In addition, conversion to Chapter 7 would make it next to impossible to the locate and marshal the missing cattle. However, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. §1208(c). The bankruptcy court also barred the debtor from filing for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 for 180 days, and Chapters 11, 12 or 13 for one year. In re Rogers, No. 17-21187-PRW, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 187 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018).

Fraud Changes Chapter 12 Debtor’s Right to Dismiss. The debtor filed Chapter 12 in 2012 and the case was dismissed without a plan being confirmed, but without a bar on refiling. The individual debtors had transferred real estate to an LLC hours before filing without full disclosure on bankruptcy schedules. The case was refiled and the trustee moved for dismissal asserting that the case was filed only to delay and hinder the collection of debts. The debtor claimed that the only conditions under which a case can be dismissed with prejudice with regard to refiling are contained in 11 U.S.C. §109(g). The court determined that the debtor’s conduct, aided by their legal counsel, was done as a plan to evade foreclosure. The court noted that the debtors have tried four times to propose a confirmable plan and have not done so, and that it was questionable whether the debtors were even eligible for Chapter 12 relief. The court determined that the present filing was in bad faith and the court imposed a 180-day ban on the debtor refiling Chapter 12. In re Valentine, No. 17-5804, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 184 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2018).

March 4, 2018

Strict Time Limit Applies For Payments To Chapter 12 Creditors In Modified Plan. The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and continued to operate his farm as a debtor-in-possession. He filed a reorganization plan and then later filed a corrected and amended plan to which various creditors objected. In response, the debtor filed another amended plan that the bankruptcy court approved. The debtor then motioned to amend the confirmed plan on the basis that his circumstances had changed. He had sold all of his grass farms that he owned and had various medical issues that limited his ability to work. His proposed modified plan called for him to make payments to certain secured and priority creditors after the plan terminated the trustee’s requirement to make payment to the creditors. Most of the payments by the debtor would be made during a period ending after five years from the date that the first payments were due to the creditors under the debtor’s original confirmed plan. The bankruptcy court rejected the debtor’s proposal, citing the unambiguous language of 11 U.S.C. §1229(c) which expressly limits modification of confirmed Chapter 12 plans to making payments to creditors within five years after the first payments to creditors were due under the debtor’s original confirmed plan. In re Stone, No. 14-31692, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 380 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2018).

Posted February 18, 2018

Retirement Account Funds Exempt From Execution. The defendant owed the plaintiff, a bank, approximately $113,000. The plaintiff confessed a judgment for the unpaid amount, and after the judgment remained unpaid the plaintiff initiated supplemental proceedings under South Carolina Code §15-39-310 et seq. During the proceedings, the defendant admitted to making significant contributions to his 401(k) plan, his IRA, and an I.R.C. §529 college savings plan in the years after he had confessed judgment. The contributions exceeded $92,000. The plaintiff claimed that the contributions were fraudulent conveyances and that the plaintiff should be allowed to execute against them. The court appointed a “master-in-equity” to handle the situation. The Sec. 529 plan had not been funded at the time of the proceeding, so the master-in-equity focused on the 401(k) and IRA contributions. The master concluded that the IRA contributions were subject to execution and levy as fraudulent conveyances that the “Statute of Elizabeth” barred. The master also found that the 401(k) contributions were exempt under S.C.C. §15-41-30(A)(14). Both parties appealed. The appellate court noted that S.C.C. §15-41-30(A) provided, in part, that IRA exemptions could be “reduced or eliminated by the amount of a fraudulent conveyance into the [IRA].” The appellate court determined that the Statute of Elizabeth did not apply, and held that the IRA contributions remained the property of the defendant because they were not “gifts, grants, alienations, bargains, transfers, [or] conveyances” subject to the Statute. In addition, the appellate court found IRA contributions are never supported by consideration, and the remaining fraudulent conveyance factors “would likely render any post-judgment contribution to an IRA fraudulent as a matter of course.” Therefore, to qualify as a fraudulent conveyance, the Court held that the plaintiff had to show that the defendant acted with actual intent to defraud the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to show intent to defraud based on the fact that the transfers were transparent and limited. As for the contributions to the 401(k) account, the court noted that there was no statutory exception to the exemption for 401(k) plans. In addition, the contributions to the account did not exceed the applicable deduction contribution limit. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue Ox, LLC, No. 5532, 2018 S.C. App. LEXIS 5 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

Posted December 31, 2017

Relief From Automatic Stay Applies to Life Estate Property. The debtor transferred a 40-acre tract to his son, retaining a life estate. The son had filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy on two prior occasions, and a creditor had received relief from the automatic stay in the second case due to the son’s delay caused by the debtor’s multiple filings. Before the creditor conducted a foreclosure sale, the debtor filed Chapter 12. The court dismissed the son’s second Chapter 12 case. The creditor claimed that the automatic stay relief applied to the debtor’s life estate. The court noted that 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(20) provides that an order entered in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(4) is binding in any other case filed within two years as to the same real estate. Under those provisions, the order applies to the debtor and any third party that has an interest in the property that seeks to obtain the benefit of the automatic stay for a two-year period. Consequently, the court determined that the automatic stay relief granted in the son’s second Chapter 12 case applied to the debtor’s case to the extent the same property was involved. In re Wilson, No. 17-10770(1)(13), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3781 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2017).

Posted December 30, 2017

Dairy Farmer’s Bank Debt Dischargeable. The petitioners, a married couple, operated a dairy and filed Chapter 12. A bank was a secured creditor with the debtors’ real property, equipment and livestock listed as collateral on the bank debt. The case was later converted to a Chapter 11 and the court determined that the value of the debtors’ collateral securing the bank loan was just shy of $2 million. A few months after conversion to Chapter 11, the debtors’ case was converted to Chapter 7. The bank filed on objection to the discharge of the debtors’ debt to the bank on numerous grounds. The bank claimed that the debtors were “self-liquidating” cattle while their case was a reorganization without informing the bank of the cattle sales which diminished their assets and injured the bankruptcy estate. However, the court pointed out that dairy farmers typically sell low-producing cows from their herd as part of a normal dairy operation and that the debtors’ cow sales were in the ordinary course of operating a dairy farm. In addition, the cow sales were cash collateral orders in the case allowed the debtors to sell personal property in the ordinary course of business and the monthly budgets included “cow sales” as cash receipts for the periods covered by the debtors’ revenue projections. In addition, the debtors’ motion to amend cash collateral budget filed in their Chapter 12 action expressly contemplated the cow sales, and the sale proceeds were deposited into the debtors’ bank accounts - a debtor-in-possession account. Also, the account funds were used for the debtors’ feed and dairy operation. The bank also claimed that the debtors had fraudulently transferred farm equipment. The court rejected this claim on the basis that not all of the assets listed on the debtors’ bankruptcy schedules were owned assets but were included so as to appear that they weren’t hiding anything. Thus, the court determined that the debtors had not transferred or concealed any farm equipment with the actual fraudulent intent that 11 U.S.C §727(a)(2)(B) requires. The bank also claimed that the debtors should be denied discharge for not listing a Georgia property on the bankruptcy schedule. However, the court noted that the debtors paid $12,000 in 2001 for a one-half interest in the “hunting shack” and listed it on an amended schedule less than one-month after filing bankruptcy. The court noted that a brother-in-law of the debtors actually paid the property taxes and other expenses for the property and that the debtors had not even visited the property in years. Their name was on the title for convenience only. Based on these facts, the evidence did not show that the debtors concealed the property from the bankruptcy estate with actual intent to defraud. The court also held that the debtors did not manipulate their debts to come within the debt limit for filing Chapter 12. There was no false claim and the knowingly and fraudulently standard was not satisfied. The court also held that the debtors provided complete, timely and accurate operating reports after conversion of the case to Chapter 11. Accordingly, the debtors were entitled to a discharge of the indebtedness owed to the bank in the Chapter 7 case. In re O’Steen, No. 3:14-bk-4766-PMG, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4423 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2017).

Posted December 29, 2017

Debtors in a Joint Texas Bankruptcy Case Can Claim Only Two Firearms As Exempt. The debtors, a married couple, filed a joint Chapter 13 case in early 2017. On their bankruptcy schedules, they claimed four firearms as exempt under state (TX) law. The bankruptcy trustee objected, claiming that only two firearms could be claimed as exempt based on the Texas Property Code §42.002(a)(7). The debtors claimed that if a single debtor could claim two firearms as exempt, then a married couple as debtors could claim four. After a hearing, the court concluded that the debtors could only claim two firearms as exempt and reserved the right to issue an opinion at a later date. In its later opinion, the court examined the statutory language and relevant caselaw and held that the debtors could only exempt two firearms. In 1973, the court noted that the Texas legislature change the language of the statute from “one gun” to “two firearms” and that two firearms meant only two. In re Haynes, No. 17-70113-hdh13, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4390 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2017).

Posted December 24, 2017

Amended Chapter 12 Plan Not Confirmed – Debtors Have 21 Days to File Another Amended Plan. The debtors, a married couple, filed Chapter 12 and their amended plan proposed to modify the payment terms to their principal creditor, which did not object. The debtors also proposed to retain a field sprayer that they would lease to their nephew via an oral lease. The lease payments would service the modified secured claim of another creditor which held a purchase money obligation that the sprayer secures. The payments terms would be extended, but the interest rate would be increased than provided via the existing contract. This creditor objected, claiming that the debtors could not “outsource” paying the claim. The creditor also claimed that allowing the lease would deprive the creditor of the right to retain its lien. The creditor also claimed that the debtors’ reorganization plan was not feasible because the debtors would use the lease income to fund the plan payments to the creditor without providing any evidence of the nephew’s ability to make the lease payments. On their bankruptcy schedules, the debtors noted the proposed lease. The lease would violate the creditor’s security agreement which barred such leasing with the creditor’s consent. Under the proposal, the creditor would retain its lien in the sprayer and the nephew would pay the lease payment to the debtors who would, in turn, use the lease payment to make their semi-annual plan payments to the creditor (including the trustee’s fee). If the nephew defaulted, the debtors would sell the sprayer and hire a commercial spraying operation. While the creditor feared that the lease would outlast the sprayer’s useful life, the court dismissed that argument. At an annual depreciation rate of 15 percent, the sprayer would not be fully depreciated at the end of seven years, at which time the creditor’s claim would be paid in full under the amended plan. The creditor objected to the amended plan, claiming that it was not proposed in good faith, did not treat them properly and was not feasible. The court disagreed. The court noted that, assuming normal depreciation, at no time would the creditor be undersecured. Thus, the plan was proposed in good faith. The court also noted that nothing in the bankruptcy code bars a debtor from using, selling or leasing property of the bankruptcy estate, the terms of such use, sale or lease must be noticed to the creditor. In this instance they weren’t. The court also reasoned that the amended plan was not feasible under 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5)-(6). There was no evidence of the nephew’s ability to make the annual lease payment, and the fact that the debtors would use the lease payment to make plan payments suggested that the debtors cannot make the plan payment to the creditor and that there was a risk of nonpayment. As such, the court declined to confirm the amended plan, but gave the debtors 21 days to file an amended plan. In re Furman, No. 17-10790, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4306 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2017).

Posted December 16, 2017

Negotiated “Adequate Protection” Binds Parties – Creditor Entitled to Administrative Expense Priority Claim. The debtors filed Chapter 12 and a motion to use the cash collateral of a creditor to have sufficient funds to operate and maintain their farming business, and the court’s cash collateral order contained a provision providing the creditor with an administrative expense priority claim for cash collateral that the debtors used. In conjunction with the request to use cash collateral, the debtors proposed to make a $6,720 adequate protection payment to the creditor. Via further negotiations, the parties agreed to the debtors’ cash payment and that the creditor’s replacement lien would be deemed perfected and that the creditor would have a superpriority administrative expense claim only subordinate to the debtors’ legal fees and legal expenses and commissions of the Chapter 12 trustee. The debtor ultimately motioned to compel payment of administrative expenses in the amount of $158,262, and the debtors objected. The court noted that the harvest proceeds of the debtors’ crops were subject to the creditor’s lien and when the proceeds were converted into cash it became cash collateral out of which the debtors’ sought to provide adequate protection. The court noted that the parties had contractually negotiated that, in exchange for cash collateral, the creditor would receive an administrative expense priority claim. The court also determined that the debtors had provided adequate protection and that “other relief” under 11 U.S.C. §1205(b)(4) included specifically negotiated adequate protection relief as long as it didn’t conflict with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the creditor was entitled to assert its administrative expense priority claim. The court also noted that the fact that the creditor didn’t need to assert its priority claim was irrelevant based on the contract that the parties negotiated. The court also determined were judicially and equitably estopped from arguing against the allowance of an administrative expense priority claim in the creditor’s favor. The court granted the creditor’s motion to compel payment of administrative expenses. In re Mortellite, No. 27-21818-ABA, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4199 (Bankr. D. N.J. Dec. 8, 2017).

Posted December 12, 2017

Chapter 12 Case Dismissed For Unreasonable Delay. The debtor proposed a Chapter 12 reorganization plan under which he would avoid two secured debts. When the debtor was not able to avoid the debts, he initially wanted more time to appeal but neither appealed nor filed an amended reorganization plan. The bankruptcy trustee motioned to dismiss the case and the court agreed. The court noted that the goal of Chapter 12 was to move the case promptly through the confirmation process. The court noted that the debtor's failure to propose an amended plan after a year of Chapter 12 relief was grounds for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. §1208(c)(3). The court also noted that the debtor had unreasonably refused to cooperate with the trustee when he failed to appear for his deposition, and had fired his legal counsel (which the court viewed as a delaying tactic). In addition, the debtor had not timely filed monthly reports and the bankruptcy estate lost value during the times of delay. The court also believed that there was no reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. The bankruptcy court’s opinion was affirmed on appeal. In re Haffey, Nos. 15-8018/8027, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4063 (Bankr. App. Panel 6th Cir. Nov. 28, 2017), aff’g., No. 14-50824, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1850 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jun. 5, 2015).

Taxes Not Dischargeable in Bankruptcy. The petitioner claimed that his 2009 tax liability, the return for which was due on April 15, 2010, was discharged in bankruptcy. He filed Chapter 7 on April 8, 2013. That assertion challenged whether the collection action of the IRS was appropriate. The Tax Court noted that taxes are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy if they become due within three years before the date the bankruptcy was filed. Because the petitioner filed bankruptcy a week too soon, the Tax Court held that his 2009 taxes were dischargeable and could be collected. As a result, the IRS settlement officer did not abuse discretion in sustaining the IRS levy. In addition, the Tax Court, held that the IRS did not abuse the bankruptcy automatic stay provision that otherwise operates to bar creditor actions to collect on debts that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed. Ashmore v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2017-233.

Posted December 1, 2017

PACA Trust Does Not Prevent Chapter 11 DIP’s Use Of Cash Collateral. The debtor, as a Chapter 11 DIP, filed a motion for an order authorizing its use of cash collateral. A bank, the DIP’s principal secured creditor, supported the motion. However, a claimant asserting PACA rights opposed the motion because, in its view, such an order would violate the claimant’s PACA trust rights as well as the rights of others as beneficiaries of the PACA trust. The PACA creates a statutory trust to protect growers of perishable agricultural products against the risk of non-payment by buyers and others. A PACA claimant, as a seller of eligible produce, has a trust claim against the qualifying inventory and proceeds that is superior to the claims and liens of the buyer’s creditors with no regard to whether the creditors are secured or unsecured and without regard to the priority level of the claim. Under the facts of the case, the claimant held an equitable interest in the bankruptcy estate with respect to its $337,159.18 PACA claim, and the question before the court was whether that equitable interest was sufficient to deny the debtor’s requested (and otherwise consensual) use of its secured lender’s cash collateral, especially where a sufficient equity cushion existed to adequately protect the PACA claimant’s claim. The court held an interim hearing on the motion at which it took testimony, granted interim relief and scheduled a final hearing. At the final hearing PACA claimant argued that its PACA claim reached all of the DIP’s property, at least if the DIP could not prove otherwise. The claimant asserted that its status as PACA trust beneficiary was sufficient to bar a debtor from utilizing the cash collateral. The claimant also argued that in the absence of proof the contrary from the DIP, all income derived during the case from any of the property in the DIP’s possession, would constitute proceeds of the PACA trust, and that the DIP could not use any of the property because it belonged to the PACA claimant and not the bankruptcy estate. The court did note the power of the PACA trust. Specifically, the court pointed out that, under PACA, growers and suppliers of perishable agricultural products who have properly preserved their rights under the statute are entitled to the benefit of a broad and powerful “floating trust” in their buyer’s qualifying inventory and proceeds thereof. These trust claims are to be paid first from trust assets, even prior to any claims or interests of secured creditors in such property. Furthermore, the court noted that the commingling of trust assets is specifically contemplated under the federal regulations implementing PACA. As the court recognized, PACA is “designed to promote priority payment to the PACA claimant.” However, the court held that to conclude that the subject matter of the PACA trust is excluded from the bankruptcy estate overstated the case holdings that the PACA claimant cited. Instead, the court determined that the PACA expressly contemplates the commingling of trust and non-trust property, the creation of a “floating trust,” and the continued operation of the PACA trustee. Thus, within the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the DIP presumptively continues operating its business in accord with applicable non-bankruptcy law. In turn, the court reasoned, this meant that it made sense to think in terms of permitting the DIP to use its buildings and equipment to conduct its business as it had done for years, along with the cash and cash equivalents derived from that use, even though they may be impressed to some extent with a statutory trust, as long as the DIP provides adequate protection of the PACA claimant’s interest in the estate property. In addition, because the value of the property of the estate that the PACA claimant believed to be impressed with the PACA trust far exceeded the claimant’s claim, the court concluded that the DIP had met its burden of showing that the claimant would be adequately protected. Therefore, the court granted the DIP’s motion authorizing the use of the cash collateral in the property in which the PACA claimant had an equitable interest, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §363 “as long as the DIP provides adequate protection of [the PACA claimant’s] interests in the estate property.” Because the DIP’s property that the PACA claimant alleged was subject to the PACA trust was much greater than the PACA claimant’s $337,159.18 claim, the court found that the PACA claimant’s interests were adequately protected. The court also disagreed with the PACA claimant’s assertion that the DIP bore the burden of proof that the property that the DIP wanted to utilize in its business operations were not property of the PACA trust. Instead, the court determined that the PACA claimant had to first prove that the claimant had an interest in the DIP’s property. After that, the DIP had to establish that adequate protection was provided to the PACA claimant. In so holding, the court distinguished a contested matter under 11 U.S.C. §363 from that involving a battle of competing property interests. In re Cherry Growers, Inc., No. 17-04127-swd, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3838 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2017).

Posted November 12, 2017

Tax Debt Not Discharged in Bankruptcy. The debtors, a married couple, filed Chapter 7 at a time when they had outstanding tax debt of $3.8 million. For many years preceding bankruptcy filing they had utilized an investment strategy known as “selling short against the box” that resulted in deferral of taxable income. However, a failed investment in a home improvement company in 1999 triggered significant income recognition and tax of nearly $2 million. They had insufficient funds to pay the tax and, thus, sold other investments to come up with the funds to pay the tax. However, those sales triggered gain exceeding $8 million and a tax liability of $3.2 million. They entered into an offer and compromise with the IRS where they offered to pay $1 million over five years – approximately one-half of the tax debt that they owed. The IRS rejected the offer because it believed the debtors’ collection potential exceeded their entire tax debt. A temporary agreement was later accepted, but condition on the debtors selling their home in Florida and reducing their standard of living. The debtors then proposed another offer-in-compromise at a time when their tax debt exceeded $6 million. Their offer was for $1.25 million, and they had not yet sold their FL home or reduced their living expenses. The IRS rejected the offer, again asserting that the debtors had the ability to pay their tax debt in full. The debtors then approached the IRS about utilizing an installment plan. The IRS approved the plan for the 2001 tax debt only, and conditioned it upon the payment in full of the debtors’ 1999 taxes. The debtors borrowed money and paid off their 1999 tax debt, and the IRS accepted the installment plan under which the debtor agreed to pay quarterly installments of $1.2 million. They sold their FL home in 2008 after paying $1.2 million of their tax debt. In 2008, the debtors again proposed an offer-in-compromise when their tax debt was $3.6 million and they proposed to pay $120,000. The IRS rejected the offer and the debtors defaulted on the installment agreement. From 2001-2010 the debtors had $13 million in income and spent over $8.5 million on personal and household expenses and charitable contributions. Their annual mortgage interest, property tax and homeowner association dues was $500,000 during this timeframe and their household costs were nearly $600,000. Their personal travel expenses exceeded $700,000 and they spent almost $250,000 on a rental home in Aspen, CO. They also spent $500,000 on business clothes and paid to have them personally ironed and also paid over $600,000 on a personal chef and household employees. They spent nearly $200,000 on automobiles and the monthly grocery bill exceeded $4,400 which did not include $78,000 of dine-out expenses. The debtors, in their bankruptcy proceeding, sought a determination that the balance of their tax debt was dischargeable, having arisen before the filing of the petition. The court disagreed, noting that 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(C) bars the discharge of tax debts if the debtor willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax, which the court determined that the debtors had done based on their lavish lifestyle. The court also noted that the debtors had abused the offer-in-compromise process to delay IRS collection efforts. The court also determined that it did not have any power to grant a partial discharge. In re Feshbach, No. 08:11-bk-12770-CPM, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3580 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2017).

Posted October 30, 2017

Amendment to Bankruptcy Law Gives Non-Priority Treatment To Capital Gain Taxes Arising From Sale of Post-Petition Farm Asset Sales. H.R. 2266, signed into law on October 26, 2017, contains the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act (Act). The Act adds 11 U.S.C. §1232 which specifies that, “Any unsecured claim of a governmental unit against the debtor or the estate that arises before the filing of the petition, or that arises after the filing of the petition and before the debtor's discharge under section 1228, as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any property used in the debtor's farming operation”… is to be treated as an unsecured claim that arises before the bankruptcy petition was filed that is not entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. §507 and is deemed to be provided for under a plan, and discharged in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §1228. The provision amends 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A) to effectively override Hall v. United States, 132 Sup. Ct. 1882 (2012) where the U.S. Supreme Court held that tax triggered by the post-petition sale of farm assets was not discharged under 11 U.S.C. §1222(a)(2)(A). The Court held that because a Chapter 12 bankruptcy estate cannot incur taxes by virtue of 11 U.S.C. §1399, taxes were not “incurred by the estate” under 11 U.S.C. §503(b) which barred post-petition taxes from being treated as non-priority. The provision is effective for all pending Chapter 12 cases with unconfirmed plans and all new Chapter 12 cases as of October 26, 2017. H.R. 2266, Division B, Sec. 1005, signed into law on October 26, 2017.

Posted September 8, 2017

Proceeds of Auction of Leased Dairy Cows Subject to Bank's Lien. A debtor borrowed money from a lender and pledged dairy cattle as collateral. The lender secured an interest in the cattle. The debtor later borrowed additional money from the lender, pledging crops, farm products and livestock as collateral with lender's security interest containing a dragnet clause. The lender secured its interest. The debtor later entered into a "Dairy Cow Lease" with a third party to allow for expansion of the herd. The third-party lessor perfected its interest in the leased cattle. The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court determined that the lease arrangement actually created a security interest rather than being a true lease. The court noted that the "lease" was not terminable by the debtor and the lease term was for longer than the economic life of the dairy cows. The third-party lessor also never provided any credible evidence of ownership of the cows, and the parties did not strictly adhere to the "lease" terms. The court noted that the lender filed first and had priority as to the proceeds from dairy cows. In addition, the bankruptcy court held that the lender's prior perfected security interest attached to all of the cows on the debtor's farm and to all milk produced post-petition and milk proceeds under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b). In a later action in the district court, a different creditor failed to comply with court’s order requiring posting of bond as a condition to stay the effect of the court’s prior ruling. As a result, there was no stay in effect during pendency of the appeal and the lender was entitled to have the proceeds turned over to it. A feed supplier creditor did not have standing to seek surcharge of the bank’s collateral under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 506(c). The bankruptcy trustee did not file a motion for surcharge and court could not order the amount that the supplier paid for feed deliveries to be retained from funds turned over to the lender. The lender's motion for abandonment and turnover of proceeds was granted. On further review of the bankruptcy court's decision concerning the dairy cow lease, the appellate court reversed. The appellate court determined that under applicable law (AZ) as set forth in the "lease" agreement, a fact-based analysis governed the determination of the nature of the agreement. However, if the lease term is for longer than the economic life of the goods involved, the "lease" is a per se security agreement. The bankruptcy court focused on the debtor's testimony that he culled about 30 percent of the cattle annually which would cause the entire herd to turnover in 40 months. That turnover time of 40 months was less than the 50-month lease term. Thus, according to the bankruptcy court, the lease was a security agreement. The appellate court disagreed with this analysis, holding that the agreement required the focus to be on the life of the herd rather than individual cows in the herd because the debtor had a duty to return the same number of cattle originally leased rather than the same cattle. Thus, the agreement was not a per se security agreement. On the economics of the transaction, the appellate court held that the lender failed to carry its burden of establishing that the actual economics of the transaction indicated the lease was a disguised security agreement. There was no option for the debtor to buy the cows at any price, and there was no option at all. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court. The cattle owned outright by the debtor were sold at auction by the bankruptcy trustee subject to the security interest of the bank. The debtor had purchased the cattle with commingled funds from the bank's account which was sufficient for the bank's lien to attach and the court, on remand, determined that it was immaterial that the funds were later reimbursed by a third party under the lease. Thus, the proceeds of the auction were subject to the bank's security interest and were the bank's property. The leasing party's brand on the cows was not sufficient under state (KY) law to establish ownership of the cows because it was unregistered. After-acquired livestock were also subject to the bank's lien, as being proceeds of the pre-petitioner lien. On further review, the appellate court upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ownership, and also upheld the bankruptcy court’s factual findings that the debtor mass-branded all of the cattle on his farm, and that the debtor sold all of the creditor’s cattle before filing bankruptcy. The appellate court also determined that the bankruptcy court correctly decided that KY law did not apply to the creditor’s brand. In re Purdy, No. 12-11592(1)(12), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2938 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 2, 2015), on remand from, Sunshine Heifers, LLC v. Citizens First Bank (In re Purdy), No. 13-6412, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15586 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2014), rev'g., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3813 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2013), aff’d., No. 12-11592(1)(12), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107565 (W.D. Ky., Aug. 15, 2016), aff’d., No. 16-6381, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16735 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).

Posted September 6, 2017

Chapter 12 Plan Not Feasible. The debtors, a married couple ages 65 and 60, owned and operated a 107-acre farm. 75 percent of the acres are wooded with the only improvement being a barn in which the debtors live in a portion of as their residence. The barn also houses their equipment and calf-raising operation. A bank holds two claims that their property secures. Their farming operation consists of raising calves and timber. The debtors filed Chapter 12 in early 2017, and the bank claimed that the timber part of the debtors’ operation did not constitute a “farming operation” as Chapter 12 requires. However, the court, based on the totality of the circumstances (and rejecting the approach of In re Easton, 883 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1989)), determined that the debtors’ wood and timber activities constitute a farming operation because the timber enterprise was ongoing and not merely a cut of all merchantable timber at one time. The court noted that the debtors harvest mature trees, sell the timber in log form and harvest tree tops as firewood. They also monitor the reseeding process, and strategically burn brush and identify timber to harvest. The court also noted that the debtors were directly involved in the farming activities on their property, and the barn and real property were essential to their calf and timber operations. The size, nature and location of the real property all were evidence that the debtors’ operation constituted a traditional farm. Thus, the debtors were eligible to file Chapter 12 because they operated a “farm” as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. §101(21), and met the other qualification requirements (e.g., the combination of their calves and timber operations exceeded 50 percent of their gross income as required by 11 U.S.C. §101(18)(A)). However, the court determined that the debtors’ Chapter 12 reorganization plan was not feasible as 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(6) requires. The court determined that the debtors “did not provide sufficient evidence of a realistic and workable framework for reorganization.” They did not provide a monthly budget, and their tax returns showed a downward trend for farming income over the past three years. They also would not be able to pay their routine expenses plus the anticipated payments to the Chapter 12 trustee. The debtors also could not support their assertion that income would rise in the future. They also listed no calves or partnership interests on their bankruptcy schedules as assets. Thus, the debtors’ plan was not feasible and the bank was entitled to relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(2)(B). In re Penick, No. 17-20178, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2422 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2017).

Posted August 28, 2017

Party Arguing for Lifting of Automatic Stay Is Not a “Governmental Unit.” The debtors are hog farmers. In 2012, the plaintiff filed suit against the debtors for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) asserting that the debtors discharged hog waste or effluent into a tributary of a river that flows into a navigable water of the United States without a CWA permit. Eight of the 11 claims alleged sought injunctive relief. In 2015, the debtors filed Chapter 11 and stayed the lawsuit, and the plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding asking the court to determine whether the injunctive relief sought amounted to a “debt” as defined by 11 U.S.C. §101(12). The court determined that it was not because the injunctive relief did not amount to a liability on a claim that gave rise to a right of payment in this case. Because the CWA does not authorize the plaintiff to recover clean-up costs, any injunctive order under the CWA requiring compliance with the CWA is not a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In re Taylor, No. 15-02730-5-SWH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1461 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. May 31, 2017). On another motion involving the automatic stay, the plaintiff claimed that 11 U.S.C. §362 does not apply to the district court litigation because that case falls under the governmental regulatory exclusion to the stay contained in 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(4). Thus, the plaintiff argues, the district court litigation should continue against the debtor. The court rejected that argument, noting that there was nothing in the statutory definition of “governmental unit” that made any reference to a private citizen or entity acting on behalf of the government. The same could be said, the court noted, to the legislative history of the provision. Thus, the exception from the stay for governmental units did not apply and the stay of the district court litigation would not be lifted. In re Taylor, No. 15-02730-5-SWH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2392 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Aug. 24, 2017).

Chapter 12 Case Dismissed. In this Chapter 12 case, the trustee motioned to dismiss the case for cause under 11 U.S.C. §1208. The court noted that the statutory language allowed it to decide whether to dismiss the case without first having an actual hearing in situations where it is appropriate, such as this case where many papers have been filed in response to the motion. The trustee claimed that the debtor is not a “business trust” that is eligible to be a debtor. The court noted that the statutory deadline to file a plan had already expired without a plan being filed and without a request for extension being filed with the court before the deadline expired. What was ultimately filed, however, didn’t come close to satisfying the requirements for a Chapter 12 plan. The court also noted that the debtor failed to cooperate with the trustee in many respects. The court also found that its granting of relief from the automatic stay to allow the debtor’s landlord to terminate a lease in order to evict the debtor, coupled with the absence of any allowed claims meant that the Chapter 12 case served no purpose. The court dismissed the case. In re M.P.I. Ltd., No. 16-00245, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2313 (Bankr. D. Haw. Aug. 17, 2017).

Posted August 5, 2017

Bankruptcy Court Uses Wrong Standard Concerning Chapter 12 Filing. The debtor appealed the bankruptcy court’s determination that she was ineligible to be a Chapter 12 debtor. The debtor had filed a Chapter 7 "no-asset" bankruptcy in 2010 and was granted a discharge. The debtor then filed a Chapter 12 case four months after receiving a discharge in the Chapter 7 case. The total amount of debt on the debtor's ranch and other property exceeded the Chapter 12 debt limits by more than $4 million. The debtor argued that only the secured portion of the debt should be counted because her personal liability had been discharged in a Chapter 7 filing. The appellate court bankruptcy panel reviewed only whether the Chapter 12 debt limit counts secured debt only up to the value of collateral. The appellate court held that obligations that are enforceable against the debtor’s property but for which there is no personal liability are still “claims” and “debts” within bankruptcy. Thus, the debtor was not eligible to file Chapter 12 bankruptcy. In re Davis, No. 12-60069, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2381 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2015), aff'g., In re Davis, No. CC-11-1692-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3631 (Bankr. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). The debtor then filed another Chapter 12 case in 2016 and, just shy of three months later, filed a motion to extend the deadline to file the Chapter 12 plan from September 12, 2016 to October 12, 2016. The bankruptcy court granted the extension based on “cause.” The debtor then filed motion for another extension of time on October 12, 2016, which the court denied. In spite of the denial, the debtor filed the Chapter 12 plan on October 17, 2016. The bankruptcy court denied the plan as untimely filed and the debtor appealed. On review, the appellate court reversed the bankruptcy decision as clearly erroneous. The appellate court noted that 11 U.S.C. §1221 standard for a court to extend the filing of a Chapter 12 plan is to be based on circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable. That, the court noted, is more stringent than a “for cause shown” standard. The bankruptcy court must make a specific finding that the debtor’s delay in filing the plan was necessitated by “circumstances beyond the debtor’s control.” Because the bankruptcy court used the wrong standard to initially extend the filing deadline, the appellate court reasoned that the bankruptcy court used the same improper standard to not grant the second extension. Thus, the appellate court vacated the bankruptcy court’s denial of the second extension and remanded the case for the correct legal standard to be applied. In re Davis, No. CC-16-1390-KuLTa, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2169 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2017).

Posted July 19, 2017

Chapter 12 Debtor Transitioning From Dairy To Specialty Cherry Farm Allowed to File Second Amended Plan. The debtor operated a dairy farm. In June of 2016, the debtor and Branch Botanicals entered into a contract by which Branch Botanicals (BB) agreed to finance a large portion of the start-up costs to convert the farm from a dairy into an operation that would produce products derived from a specific type of cherry plant. BB had not developed a market for the products in the debtor’s area yet, but had done so on the West Coast. The debtors (and BB) sought to reamortize matured Farm Credit loans, but failed to reach an agreement. As a consequence, the debtor filed chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code in November of 2016, and their reorganization plan in early 2017. Farm Credit and other creditors objected to the plan and the debtor filed amended plan in June of 2017. Farm Credit objected to the amended plan on the grounds that the debtor’s property was undervalued and, as such, failed the liquidation test of 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(4). Farm Credit also claimed that the amended plan violated 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5) for having too low of an interest rate and an unreasonable term of repayment. Farm Credit also claimed that the plan was not feasible. The bankruptcy court determined that the original appraiser’s value of $2,775,000.00 for the debtor’s property was a valid starting point. However, because the property was appraised as a dairy farm, and a market did not yet exist for the products derived from the new crop proposed to be sold, the court determined that a value of $2,500,000.00 fairly represented the current value of the assets. In addition, the evidence as a whole persuaded the court that the proposed interest rate was too low and the balloon payment too long to compensate Farm Credit for the risk of funding what was essentially a start-up venture. The court determined that a 2.5% adjustment over prime was appropriate and that a seven-year balloon, instead of the debtor’s proposed nine-year balloon would be more appropriate because within seven years it will be known whether the venture with BB will either succeed or not. In addition, the court determined that the debts owed to Farm Credit and another creditor were business debts because they were incurred to finance the farming business. Thus, the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. §1201 did not apply. Finally, the court determined that the debtors could not qualify for a preliminary injunction because they were not likely to suffer irreparable harm and they did not have a high probability of success on the merits. For these reasons, the court denied confirmation of the debtor's amended chapter 12 plan, but gave the debtor 21 days to filed a second amended plan. In re Terry Properties, L.L.C., No. 16-71449 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1873 (Bankr. W. D. Va. Jul. 6, 2017).

Posted June 7, 2017

Alleged Clean Water Act Violations Are not “Debts.” The debtors are hog farmers. In 2012, the plaintiff filed suit against the debtors for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) asserting that the debtors discharged hog waste or effluent into a tributary of a river that flows into a navigable water of the United States without a CWA permit. Eight of the 11 claims alleged sought injunctive relief. In 2015, the debtors filed Chapter 11 and stayed the lawsuit, and the plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding asking the court to determine whether the injunctive relief sought amounted to a “debt” as defined by 11 U.S.C. §101(12). The court determined that it was not because the injunctive relief did not amount to a liability on a claim that gave rise to a right of payment in this case. Because the CWA does not authorize the plaintiff to recover clean-up costs, any injunctive order under the CWA requiring compliance with the CWA is not a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In re Taylor, No. 15-02730-5-SWH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1461 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. May 31, 2017).

Posted May 28, 2017

Bare Replacement Lien on Future Crops Deemed Sufficient To Provide Adequate Protection. The debtors filed Chapter 12 in late 2016. They farm about 550 acres and raise cattle. The majority of their farm ground is leased on a cash rent basis. They borrowed money from a bank and granted the bank a lien in their crops and proceeds. They motioned to use cash collateral of the bank to fund about $180,000 of crop input costs for the 2017 crop year and the payment of about $85,000 of cash rent for 2017. At the time, the debtors had cash collateral of the bank of $50,935.99 from 2015 crop proceeds and about $220,000 of 2016 crop proceeds, and $52,117 of USDA government payments. They proposed to grant a security interest post-petition to the bank in the 2017 crop, crop insurance and government payments in which they had an interest or may subsequently acquire. They proposed to grant the bank a priority administrative expense claim to the extent the proceeds from the 2017 crop and related collateral were insufficient to repay the expended cash collateral plus interest. The bank objected, claiming that the debtors had consistently lost money on farming since 2007 and that the proposed replacement lien in the crop and related collateral and proposed administrative expense claim in the bank’s favor did not provide adequate protection of the bank’s interest in the cash collateral. The court noted that 11 U.S.C. §363 governs the use of cash collateral and that a bare replacement lien in non-existent crops is generally not enough to provide adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. §1205. However, the court noted that the debtors submitted detailed cash flow projections as well as expense projections and how the cash collateral would be repaid. The debtors also submitted crop input cost analysis and showed how their reorganization plan payments can be made in 2017. The bank held that the debtors had carried their burden to establish that adequate protection was provided and that additional security in the form of government payments and crop insurance proceeds was also available to the bank. The court granted the debtors’ motion upon them granting the bank a first replacement lien on their 2017 crop and related collateral; purchasing multi-peril crop insurance on all of their 2017 crops and maintain it until the crop is harvested and sold with the bank named as beneficiary or loss-payee on the policy; executing the necessary documents to secure the bank’s interest in government payments of any nature; provide the bank with an administrative expense priority claim for any collateral deficiency; and provide the bank with a monthly operating report concerning the status of the collateral, income, expense and cash flow and the manner in which the cash collateral is used; and provide the bank with the right to inspect the debtors’ business premises and records at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice. In re Blake, No. 16-60425, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1278 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2017).

Posted May 27, 2017

Chapter 12 Debtor’s Counsel Can Get Paid For Post-Confirmation Services. The debtor filed a Chapter 12 petition and received confirmation of the Chapter 12 plan. The debtor sought to modify the confirmed plan and the debtor’s legal counsel sought to be paid by the debtor and/or the bankruptcy estate for post-confirmation services. The court held that the legal counsel was entitled to compensation because the debtor’s counsel was retained as a legal professional via 11 U.S.C. §327, and the bankruptcy estate continued to exist post-confirmation via 11 U.S.C. §1207. The court reasoned that as long as the legal counsel met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §330 and could show that the services benefited the Chapter 12 estate, then payment could be awarded. The court also determined that 11 U.S.C. §1229(a)(2) allowed the debtor to modify the Chapter 12 plan post-confirmation because of a drafting issue that allowed differing interpretations of the Confirmation Order, a problem with the plan’s implementation and payment timing. In re LaRosa Greenhouse, LLP, 565 B.R. 304 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2017).

Posted May 21, 2017

Selling Gravel Did Not Constitute a “Farming Operation” For Purposes of Chapter 12 Eligibility. The debtor filed a Chapter 12 bankruptcy petition and several creditors motioned to dismiss the case on the basis that the debtor was ineligible for Chapter 12 because the debtor was not a family farmer and, as a result, the case was filed in bad faith as a dilatory tactic to forestall foreclosure. The debtor objected to the motions, claiming that she was a family farmer entitled to file Chapter 12. The court, citing 11 U.S.C. §101(18)(A), noted that Chapter 12 eligibility required five requirements to be satisfied: (1) the debtor must be an individual; (2) the debtor must be engaged in farming; (3) the debtor must have aggregate debts not exceeding $4,153,150; (4) the debtor’s aggregate, non-contingent debts must be at least 50 percent related to a farming operation that the debtor owns, and; (5) the debtor’s income from farming must exceed 50 percent of the debtor’s gross income for either the most recent prepetition full taxable year or each of the second or third preceding taxable years. The court found that the debtor is an individual. However, the court determined that the debtor was not engaged in a farming operation based on the totality of the circumstances. Crushing rock into aggregate and gravel, the court opined, is not characteristic of a farming operation. Rather, it is more like a mining operation and is not renewable like crops or livestock. It is also not subject to the inherent risks of farming, and the statutory definition of farming operation makes specific reference to the growing and cultivation of farm commodities in their unmanufactured state. Thus, while the debtor was engaged in some farming operations in addition to the gravel operation, the business associated with the gravel business cannot count as farming. The court went on to find that the debtor’s aggregate debt was within the debt limit, and that the debts arising from farming operations were less than 50 percent of the debtor’s total debts. However, the debtor’s farming income was found to be less than 50 percent of the debtor’s total income. Thus, the debtor did not qualify for Chapter 12. The court also determined that the debtor’s Chapter 12 petition had been filed in bad faith based on numerous factors – prior abusive bankruptcy filings; concerted efforts to forestall completion of multiple foreclosure sales, and; lack of honesty and candor in addressing the court. The Chapter 12 case was dismissed. In re Carter, No. 17-50262, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1286 (Banrk. M.D. N.C. May 11, 2017).

Creditor Can’t Get Bankruptcy Case Dismissed To Collect on Debt. The debtor borrowed $3.5 million from a creditor, with the debt reduced to a promissory note via which the debtor granted the creditor a deed of trust on tracts of real estate and a lien on all of the debtor’s personal property. Two years later, the creditor held a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the debtor’s real property. However, the creditor did not seek a deficiency judgment against the debtor within 90 days as required under state (NE) law (Neb. Rev. Stat. §76-1013). The debtor later filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the creditor motioned to dismiss the bankruptcy case as a bad-faith filing and relief from the automatic stay in order to enforce its lien in other collateral. The court noted that Neb. Rev. Stat. §76-1013 allowed only non-judicial efforts to collect and bars “an action” to recover the balance due under an obligation for which a trust deed has been given as security. The court determined that “an action” meant “legal suit” and not nonjudicial foreclosure. The court held that the creditor was seeking a judicial remedy (dismissal of the debtor’s bankruptcy) as a way of preventing the debtor from reorganizing in an attempt to collect on the debt. That action is barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. §76-1013. In addition, the debtor’s acknowledgement of the debt did not eliminate the statutory provision. The motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case was denied, and the matter was set for trial on the issue of relief from the automatic stay. In re JN Medical Corporation, No. BK17-80174, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1372 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 17, 2017).

Posted May 3, 2017

Vehicles Are Not Exempt From Creditors and Debtors Allowed to Identify Portion of Farmland That is Homestead. The debtors, a married couple, claimed three pickup trucks and an all-terrain vehicle as farming/ranching vehicles/implements as part of their bankruptcy case. They also claimed 170.44 acres (which included their home) as an exempt homestead. The tract was part of a 315.58 tract. The farmland, pickups and ATV were all leased to their farming entities – a farm partnership and an LLC. A creditor (bank) objected to the exemptions due to the leases. The debtors elected to use state (TX) exemption provisions. Under TX law, the debtors bore the burden to establish their homestead rights, and the court determined that the debtors did establish the homestead character of up to 200 acres of the farm as having been used for farming purposes. On the creditor’s claim that the debtors’ homestead rights had been terminated, the court noted that the lease of the farmland was pursuant to an oral year-to-year lease with stated plans to continue the arrangement for at least the next three years which meant that the debtors had given up possession of the property to the partnership. However, the court determined that the lease was only temporary based on credible testimony that once the senior generation retired from farming, the partnership would be terminated and the debtors would regain personal control and possession of the land. Accordingly, the homestead associated with the farmland was allowed. While the creditor argued that the debtor had reduced the size of the homestead exemption to 100 acres due to his divorce and single status, but the court held that the creditor was unable to prove abandonment of the homestead to the acreage exceeding 100 due to the divorce based on the lack of evidence. As for the pickups and ATV, the court sustained the creditor’s objection to the debtors’ claiming them as exempt. The debtors did not use the vehicles for farming purposes. The court denied the creditor’s objection to the debtors’ homestead exemption claim, but directed the debtors to amend their claim to specifically identify what part of 315.58 acres constitutes their 170.44-acre exemption. In re Pearson, No. 16-50248-rlj12, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1151 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2017).

Posted February 18, 2017

Creditors Establish Cause to Dismiss Chapter 12 Case. In 2012, the debtors filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy for their dairy operation. After a year of negotiations, the debtors, creditors and bankruptcy trustee entered into a stipulation concerning the terms of the Chapter 12 plan, and the court subsequently approved the reorganization plan. A few months later, the debtors motioned to modify the confirmed plan to cure an arrearage. A modified plan was subsequently confirmed by the court. The death of the primary operator of the dairy had a significant impact on the dairy’s operation and the debtors became delinquent in their plan payments. The trustee motioned to dismiss the case and the creditors filed motions to enforce their rights under the stipulation. The court granted the debtors additional time to file a modified plan under which the debtors would reduce the size of the milking herd, pay the sale proceeds directly to one creditor and cure the delinquent payments over the balance of the plan. The issue before the court was whether the creditors established cause for dismissal of the case and, if not, whether the modified plan could be confirmed. The court noted that the debtors had breached the terms of the stipulation on several counts including the sale of cows without a creditor’s permission and failure to pay over sale proceeds to a creditor. In addition, the court noted the patience and flexibility of the creditors to work with the debtors and that the stipulation was a key element of the approval of the bankruptcy plan. Accordingly, the court determined that the creditors had established cause to dismiss the cases in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §1208(c)(6) based on the breach of the stipulation agreement. In re Milky Way Organic Farm, No. 12-10742, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 417 (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 14, 2017).

Posted February 10, 2017

State Pension Plan Is Not An Asset for Purposes of Insolvency Calculation. The petitioner was a police officer who retired and began receiving monthly distributions from his state pension plan. The plan withheld federal income tax payments, and the plan benefits could not be converted into a lump-sum cash amount, assign the interest, sell the interest or borrow against or from the plan. Under the plan, if the petitioner died his spouse would receive payments under the plan until her death. In the tax year in question, a creditor cancelled about $450,000 of debt that was secured by real estate that was not the petitioner’s principal residence. The debt discharged included $30,000 of interest. Normally, cancelled debt is included in gross income under I.R.C. §61(a)(12), but an exclusion exists for any payment of a liability that would have given rise to a deduction. Thus, the petitioner did not include the forgiveness of $30,000 of interest in gross income and did not deduct it on the return. The IRS conceded that point before trial. In addition, I.R.C. §108(a)(1)(B) excludes from gross income cancelled debt to the extent the taxpayer is insolvent at the time the debt is discharged. The petitioner calculated his insolvency to be $346,418 and included the balance of the principal debt discharged of $72,178 in gross income. The petitioner arrived at the value by not including the value of the pension in the calculation of insolvency. The IRS claimed that the full amount of the principal debt forgiveness of $418,596 was cancelled debt income on the basis that the value of the petitioner’s pension should be included in income. If the petitioner was required to include his interest in the pension plan in the calculation of insolvency, the petitioner would not be insolvent and the full principal amount discharged would be included in income. Before trial, revaluations of other assets resulted in an insolvency computation of $293,308 immediately before the discharge if the pension were not included in the insolvency computation. The court determined that the pension was not included in the insolvency computation because the pension did not give the petitioner the ability to pay an immediate tax on income from the canceled debt and, therefore, was not an asset within the meaning of I.R.C. §108(d)(3). Scheiber v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2017-32.

Posted February 7, 2017

Creditor Can’t Deny Debtor a Homestead Exemption. The debtor sought to carve-out a one-half acre tract that he owned as his homestead after the creditor sought to have the debtor’s property sold at auction. The creditor claimed that the debtor’s ability to do so was subject to local zoning ordinances and rules with respect to property division. Because the debtor’s property could not be subdivided and be in compliance with controlling ordinances the creditor claimed that the debtor should not be entitled to the homestead exemption. The trial court allowed the exemption after accepting the debtor’s plat designation and the creditor appealed. On appeal, the court noted that Iowa Code §561.3 specifies that homestead rights are “jealously guarded” by the law and are a creature of public policy. In addition, the court determined that there was no “special declaration” that the legislature had made that anything a local government did to control the division of property would have any impact on the homestead right. The court accepted the debtor’s homestead plat as the designated homestead. First American Bank v. Urbandale Laser Wash, L.L.C., No. 16-0081, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 19 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Posted February 6, 2017

Homestead Exemption Not Limited to Debtor’s House. The debtor filed Chapter 7 and listed on his bankruptcy schedules a 19-acre rural tract as his homestead valued at $695,000. The tract included the debtor’s home a detached garage or shop building with an upstairs room, a second small home and a pole barn used for storage. The smaller house had been built for the debtor’s in-laws, but after their deaths the debtor rented it out with an intent to ultimately move his mother to it. The home and outbuildings are located closely to each other with a small pond also located nearby. All of the buildings are within walking distance of each other. The debtor does not use any of the 19 acres for farming as he owns no livestock and performs no crop farming. The debtor was in default on two mortgages on the entire tract. The creditor (bank) objected to the debtor claiming the entire tract and associated building as exempt as a homestead. The state in which the bankruptcy was filed (OK) had opted out of the federal exemptions and, under OK law the homestead must be the debtor’s principal residence and up to 160 acres of land which may be in one or more parcels. The court noted that the homestead exemption is to be liberally construed and that the property sought to be a homestead be used in some way as the debtor’s homestead. The court also noted that the homestead is not limited to a single dwelling, but “…embraces everything connected therewith which may be used and is used for the more perfect enjoyment of the home...”. Based on this standard, the entire property was exempt as the debtor’s homestead. In re Costigan, No. 16-80583-TRC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 223 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Jan. 25, 2017).

Posted February 5, 2017

Secured Creditor Not Entitled to Default Rate of Interest. A secured creditor filed an application for post-petition interest and fees. The debtor had executed three notes in favor of the creditor and defaulted on all three notes. The total amount due on the notes was approximately $1.5 million. The notes were secured by the debtor’s farm which was worth $2 million. Thus, the creditor was oversecured. The notes had a contractual default rate of interest specified at 5 percent (contract rate plus 5 percent). While 11 U.S.C. §506(b), specifies that a fully secured creditor is entitled to interest on its claims, the court determined that doesn’t necessarily mean the default rate. Instead, a presumption arises that the contractual rate of interest should be used, but that presumption can be rebutted based on equitable considerations. Here, the court noted, the evidence demonstrated that the evidence showed that the debtor had rebutted the presumption. Using such interest would effectively double the interest rate on each of the three notes. The creditor’s risk of nonpayment has been low throughout the debtor’s bankruptcy case because it is oversecured, and application of the default rate would decrease and possibly eliminate payments to the unsecured creditors. Thus, the secured creditor’s application was denied. In re Perkins, No. 16-10383(1)(12), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 276 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2017).

Posted January 16, 2017

Debtor Satisfies Income and Debt Test For Chapter 12 Eligibility. The debtor operated a farming business in partnership with her spouse and her parents. The debtor was a partner in two farm partnerships. Both partnerships filed Chapter 11, and the debtor substantially liquidated all of the assets in the two partnership cases. The court then dismissed both cases. The debtor still held debts based on her partnership liabilities and individual guarantees. Because of the liquidation of the equipment and real estate, the debtor incurred significant tax liabilities for the tax year ending 2015. The debtor and he son then each filed their own individual Chapter 12 cases to handle the remaining partnership debts. The debtor put a Chapter 12 plan together and the creditor objected to the debtor’s amended plan on the basis that the debtor was not a “family farmer” and because the debtor’s aggregate debt exceeds the Chapter 12 debt limit of $4,031,575. The creditor claimed that the debtor could not include the pass-through income from the farming partnerships of which she was a partner on the basis that they were separate and distinct from her farming operation, but provided no support for that position and the court rejected it. As a result, the court determined that the debtor met the Chapter 12 eligibility requirement of 11 U.S.C. §101(18) by having more than 50 percent of the debtor’s income arise from farming operations in either 2015 or in each of 2014 and 2013. On the creditor’s excess debt level claim, the creditor claimed that the debtor’s total debt amount should include claims listed on the debtor’s schedules even though they weren’t backed-up with a proof of claim. The creditor also sought to include the federal tax liability from the sale of land and equipment by the partnerships. While the court held that federal taxes were to be included when calculating the debtor’s total debt for purposes of the statutory limit, the debtor was still beneath the aggregate debt limit because at the time the petition was filed (before the proofs of claim were filed), the aggregate debt did not include any proofs of claim filed post-petition and the debtor’s schedules were not fraudulently filed. In re Perkins, No. 16-10383(1)(12), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4440 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2016).

Some Farm Debt Not Dischargeable. The debtor was a row crop farmer that had been in the farming business for all of his adult life, but started experiencing financial difficulties in later 2012 and early 2013 and became overdrawn on two bank accounts. In the spring of 2013, the debtor approached an input supplier to buy inputs for the 2013 spring planting. The debtor had an existing line of credit with the supplier which he had paid off in full from crop proceeds at harvest time. The suppler advised the debtor that he would need to obtain financing through a financial services firm and gave the debtor a loan application. The signed loan application showed that the debtor had a positive net worth and the loan was approved which allowed the debtor to buy inputs up to the amount allowed by the loan. The debtor then also bought additional inputs under the existing line of credit (open account) with the supplier, and then applied for an additional credit line for the next year’s crops. The new credit line application was denied after a complete analysis of the debtor’s finances which revealed that, at the time of the initial loan application, the debtor actually had a negative net worth. The fall 2013 crop harvest and crop prices were sub-par and the debtor defaulted on the loans and filed Chapter 7. The supplier wanted the loans to be declared non-dischargeable in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B) due to fraud. The debtor asserted that he did not properly understand certain terms of the loan application form, but the court rejected the debtor’s explanation. The court held that the credit extended under the loan application was non-dischargeable, but that the amount under the open account was dischargeable based on the fact that the debtor made no representations to the supplier that were false. In re French, No. 15-40758, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4125 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2016).

Posted January 4, 2017

State Law Mediation Inapplicable to Farm Bankruptcy. The plaintiffs bought an 80-acre tract and secured the purchase with a mortgage on the five acres containing their homestead. The tract was a single 80-acre tract due to county zoning that required each tract to be at least 10 acres. Twenty years later, the plaintiffs obtained a mortgage from the defendant that was secured by the 75 acres that didn’t include their homestead. Two years later the plaintiffs filed bankruptcy and included the defendant’s mortgage on their schedule of debts. Foreclosure proceedings later began, and the property was sold at sheriff’s sale with a one-year redemption period running from the time of sale. After the redemption period, the defendant got the county to assign separate property identification numbers to a 70-acre parcel and an additional 5-acre parcel that surrounded the homestead parcel so that the defendants could sell the 70-acre tract and have a remaining 10-acre tract to comply with county zoning. The defendant offered to give the 5-acre tract to the plaintiffs, but they refused and also refused to vacate upon receiving an eviction notice. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint. The trial court ruled that the Minnesota Farmer-Lender Mediation Act (Minn. Stat. §§583.20-.32) did not apply to the foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed because the MFLA does not apply by its terms to any debt that has been listed as a scheduled debt of a debtor in bankruptcy and the defendant filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the debt was not subject to mediation and, as a result, the defendant did not need to show that the plaintiffs’ annual farm income was less than $20,000. Also, because the property securing the mortgage was agricultural land without a residential dwelling, the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice of foreclosure prevention counseling services. Grimlie v. Agstar Financial Services, No. A16-0877, 2016 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1155 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2016).

Posted November 25, 2016

Notice of Foreign Judgment May Not Have Created a Judicial Lien on Tenancy-by-the-Entirety Property. A creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor’s business for approximately $765,000. The debtor’s wife was not included in the judgment, but they owned another property as tenants by the entirety. The creditor tried to get a judicial lien on the tenancy by-the-entirety property. Later, the debtor filed Chapter 7 and the wife did not join. The tenancy-by-the-entirety property was listed in the debtor’s schedules and a $15,000 homestead exemption was claimed under Mo. Rev. Stat. §513.475 and 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(3)(B). The debtor moved to avoid the creditor’s lien under 11 U.S.C. §522(f)(1) on the basis that it impaired the homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The creditor argued that the lien could not be avoided because it had not yet attached to the tenancy-by-the-entirety property under Missouri law. However, 11 U.S.C. §522(f) provides that the debtor "may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption...". Based on Ferry v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the term "fixing" was intended by Congress to be less restrictive than the term "attachment," and would include a lien which is not yet, and may never be, enforceable. Thus, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court and held that the lien could be avoided. On further review, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The appellate court noted that because the property at issue was titled in the debtor and his spouse as tenants-by-the-entirety, neither spouse had a separate interest in the property subject to execution, and that a judgment against one spouse does not constitute a lien on tenancy by the entirety property. Thus, a question remained whether the creditor had a recognizable lien in the tenancy by the entirety property in the first instance, and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to address the matter in the first instance. In re O’Sullivan, No. 16-1526, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20389 (8th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016).

Posted November 13, 2016

Farm Supply Business Doesn’t Get Priority Claim for Goods Delivered to Farm Partnership Within 20-Days of Partner’s Petition. A father and son operated a farm together as a general partnership. A farm supply dealer (creditor) sold and delivered (in the ordinary course of business) $45,466.00 worth of farm supplies to the partnership within the 20-day period immediately preceding the father filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Thus, the creditor held an unsecured claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. The creditor motioned to have the claimed allowed as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(9) which would give it priority over all other unsecured claims. However, the court noted, to get that status, the creditor had to establish that the goods were sold to the debtor and received by the debtor within the 20-day period in the ordinary course of business. Here, the goods were sold and delivered to the partnership. The joint and several liability theory of partnership law did not convert the debt to a personal obligation of the debtor due to the adoption by the state (MS) of the Revised UCC and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. Under those revisions, a partnership is a distinct entity from its members and is not a co-owner of partnership property and has no interest in partnership property. Because the parties stipulated that the supplies were delivered to the partnership, the debt did not satisfy the elements of an administrative claim and remained a general unsecured claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case because the debtor, as a general partner, is personally, jointly and severally liable for the debt. In re Spencer, No. 16-11722-JDW, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3867 (Banrk. N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2016).

Posted November 5, 2016

Emotional Distress Insufficient For Award of Damages Against IRS. The plaintiffs, a married couple, filed Chapter 13 in late 2012. The filing triggered the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. §362(a). However, on four separate occasions, the IRS sent notices to the plaintiffs demanding payment for back taxes in violation of the automatic stay. The plaintiffs claimed that the IRS notices caused them significant emotional harm. The bankruptcy court agreed, and awarded the plaintiffs emotional distress damages under 11 U.S.C. §362(k). On appeal, the court reversed. The court did not believe that the evidence was sufficient to support an award of damages for emotional distress due to a lack of causal connection. Also, the court also determined that sovereign immunity bars claims against the defendant that seek emotional distress damages (in the absence of direct economic damages) under 11 U.S.C. §362(k). Hunsaker v. United States, No. 6:16-cv-00386-MC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145460 (D. Ore. Oct. 20, 2016).

Posted September 11, 2016

State Law Bars Bars Court From Requiring Bankrupt Debtor To Use Inheritance To Pay Wife’s Creditors. The debtors, a married couple, filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The husband received a $221,510.53 inheritance 34 months into the Chapter 13 reorganization plan. They proposed to use a portion of the funds to pay off all of the husband’s debts (including the mortgage on the couple’s home) and keep the rest of the funds without paying on any of the debts of the wife. The result would be to leave about $12,000 of the wife’s debts unpaid. The bankruptcy trustee objected on the basis that all claims should be paid from the inheritance. The court noted that there was no controlling authority in the jurisdiction (MO) on the issue of whether a post-petition inheritance was property of the bankruptcy estate, but also determined that state law governs the nature of a property interest. On that point the court noted that MO. Rev. Stat. §451.250.1 specifies that an inheritance is the separate property of a spouse that receives it and cannot be taken by process of law to pay the debts of the other spouse. Thus, the question is whether a joint bankruptcy filing of the spouses alters the outcome of the state law provision. The court noted that in In re True, 285 B.R. 405 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002), the court held that a farm was not available to pay the debtor-spouse’s separate debts under §451.250.1 where the farm was titled exclusively in the non-debtor spouse’s name. Thus, in the present case, the inheritance was the separate property of the husband and was included in the bankruptcy estate for payment of debts for which he alone was responsible. The court also held that the inheritance constituted a substantial change in circumstances that required an amended plan be filed. Under 11 U.S.C. §1322(a)(1), the plan must provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the trustee’s supervision and control. The court held that the proposal to commit the inheritance to pay the husband’s creditors in full complied with that requirement, given that the inheritance is the husband’s separate property. The proposal was also not in bad faith because the wife’s creditors would not be entitled to be paid from the husband’s inheritance if the couple were not in bankruptcy. In re Portell, No. 12-44058-13, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3301 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 9, 2016).

Posted July 16, 2016

Chapter 12 Case Can’t Be Converted To Chapter 11. The debtor filed a Chapter 12 petition along with schedules showing aggregate debt of almost $4.5 million. A creditor filed a motion to dismiss the debtor’s Chapter 12 petitioner because the debtor’s aggregate debt exceeded that allowed by Chapter 12 - $4,031,575. The debtor then filed a motion to convert the Chapter 12 case to a Chapter 11, which has no limit on a debtor’s aggregate debt. The debtor claimed that conversion to Chapter 11 was permissible because 11 U.S.C. §1208 doesn’t expressly bar conversion from Chapter 12 to Chapter 11, and because the Chapter 12 had been filed in good faith, conversion would not prejudice creditors, and conversion would be equitable. The creditor objected to conversion on the basis that there is no statutory authority for such conversion. The court noted that the issue had not been addressed by the First Circuit, but that other Circuits were split on the issue. The court examined the legislative history of Chapter 12 to note that early draft versions of Chapter 12 legislation contained limited authority to convert a Chapter 12 to Chapter 11 or 13, the final conference report did not contain any allowance for good faith conversion. Thus, based on a plain reading of the statute, the court denied conversion. In re Colon, No. 16-0060, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2344 (Bankr. D. P.R. Jun. 21, 2016).

Chapter 12 Case Converted To Chapter 7 Due to Debtor’s Fraud. The debtor leased farm property that the debtor used to raise hay. Upon lease termination, the debtor was ordered to vacate the leased premises. Immediately after doing so, the debtor filed Chapter 12 and, eight days later, entered into a contract for the sale of hay to be harvested from the formerly leased property to a buyer. The debtor received a deposit of $135,000 from the buyer, but did not notify the buyer that the debtor’s lease had been terminated or that the debtor had filed Chapter 12. The buyer moved to convert the debtor’s Chapter 12 case to Chapter 7 on the grounds of fraud, and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. On appeal, the district court affirmed on the basis that the bankruptcy court properly applied 11 U.S.C. § 1208(d) in concluding that the debtor had committed fraud “in connection to the case.” The district court also found that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in making its factual findings insomuch as the record clearly established that the debtor failed to inform the customer about material information. On further review, the appellate court affirmed. In re Clark, No. 14-35242, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10835 (9th Cir. Jun. 15, 2016), aff’g., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28375 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2014), aff’g., 525 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014).

Posted April 8, 2016

Administrative Expense Claim for Maintenance and Upkeep of Property as Hunting Preserve Denied. The debtor applied for an administrative expense claim of $53,255.92 to be paid ahead of the unsecured creditors for upkeep and maintenance of real estate and animals on the bankruptcy estate property so that the property could be maintained as a hunting preserve for deer and wild hogs. The debtor submitted charts listing expenses and some invoices, but no corresponding documentation showing payment of the expenses. The debtor had time records showing time spent maintaining the property. The bankruptcy trustee also allowed the debtor to stay on the property rent-free if he maintained it. Based on this evidence, the court ruled that the debtor had failed to establish entitlement to the administrative expense claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Brooks, No. 13-10860, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1031 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016).

Chapter 12 Debtor Allowed To Assume Executory Leases. The debtor had farmed since 1967 on his mother’s property and later on his own property as well as property he leased from other persons. He also raised cattle and owned an auto repair business that he leased to a third party to operate a muffler shop. The debtor was also the co-personal representative of his mother’s estate. A creditor of the debtor sued him when he failed to pay for crop inputs. The creditor obtained a judgment and has a lien on his property. The debtor filed Chapter 12 and sought to assume executory contracts and leases he had with the Farm Service Agency (FSA), a farm landlord, his mother’s estate and the muffler shop. He gave uncontroverted testimony that the assumptions would benefit the bankruptcy estate, based on his business judgment. The court determined that the debtor’s judgment, based on the facts, was not manifestly unreasonable. In re Miller, No. 15-61159-12, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1046 (D. Mont. Apr. 1, 2016).

Posted April 4, 2016

Chapter 12 Plan Confirmable If It Is Amended In Accordance With Court Directions. A custom farming operation filed Chapter 12 and five months later filed an amended plan. The managers of the operation also filed Chapter 12 and an amended plan on the same dates. The operation had been custom harvesting crops in New Mexico, Texas and Colorado for approximately 20 years at various rates. The lack of recordkeeping by the managers troubled the major creditor. The managers also operated a farming business on 960 acres of tillable land in New Mexico and sharecropping arrangements with neighbors. A drought in 2012-2014 caused substantial financial problems and they increased their line of credit with the major creditor significantly at a 5 percent interest rate. The debt exceeded the value of the farm, but the major creditor remained over-secured with a loan-to-value ratio of 64 percent. Additional existing collateral could reduce that ratio to 59 percent. The managers proposed a plan under which they would sell a newer tractor, and use the funds to pay down the line of credit partially or for payment of farming expenses. All disposable income would be committed to the plan for five years and the creditor could retain all liens and receive minimum payments of $45,000 annually. If the creditor is not paid in full over five years, then the debtors would liquidate collateral including the farm. The creditor objected to the plan based on the feasibility requirement of 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(6). The court approved the plan, subject to modification by the court – increasing the annual payment to the major creditor so that the loan could be amortized ($112,000 annually); quarterly reporting to the major creditor and the trustee with sufficient detail, and; payment to other creditors. In re Bright Harvesting, No. 15-11178 tr12, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4097 (Bankr. D. N.M. Dec. 4, 2015).

Posted April 1, 2016

Court Dismisses Chapter 12 Bankruptcy For Futility. The debtor filed a Chapter 12 plan and three amended plans. Two large creditors and the trustee objected to each plan, and none of the plans were confirmed. Finally, the creditors sought dismissal of the case, alleging unreasonable delay prejudicial to the creditors and the lack of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. The debtor sought confirmation or, in the alternative, leave to amend to file a fifth plan. The court denied confirmation of the plan and leave to amend. Instead, the court dismissed the case, finding that a reorganization was objectively futile. The debtor could not afford to make his payments in the proposed plan, even though the terms were not commercially reasonable at the proposed interest rate. Any adjustment to the interest rate would make the payments even higher and the debtor even less able to make them. The proposed plan failed to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5) and (6). On appeal, the court affirmed. The appellate court upheld the denial of the debtor's third amended plan for failure the prove asset values and errors in financial projections and the statement of current conditions. The court also determined that the debtor should not be allowed to file a fourth amended plan for lack of support of current financial condition. The case was properly dismissed because a confirmable plan was not produced within a year of the petition. The debtor filed another case a month later and creditors objected to confirmation and moved to dismiss the case. The court considered the prior rulings and noted that the debtor had made some progress in leadership and bookkeeping and had liquidated some real estate with the proceeds paying down a large portion of the debt. However, the court ruled that the debtor still had not put together a viable reorganization plan that could be confirmed. The court dismissed the case without leave to amend. In re Keith's Tree Farms, No. 13-71316, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4243 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2014), aff'd. sub. nom., Keith's Tree Farms v. Grayson National Bank, et al., 535 B.R. 647 (W.D. Va. 2015); new case, In re Keiths’ Tree Farm, No. 15-71262, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 851 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2016).

Commercial Fishing Business Not Eligible For Chapter 12. The debtor is an LLC that owns a fishing vessel that it uses in its commercial fishing business in Alaska. The debtor’s member entity had also filed Chapter 12, but that case was dismissed due to the debtor’s willful failure to comply with the orders of the bankruptcy court. A creditor held a secured lien against the debtor’s fishing vessel and sought dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 12 case on the grounds that the debtor did not qualify as a “family fisherman with regular income” under 11 U.S.C. §109(f) and that cause existed for dismissal. In May of 2015, the debtor’s member and one of its members filed for Chapter 12 relief. Those cases were jointly administered and resulted in an adequate protection order. The same day that the adequate protection order was issued, the debtor filed for Chapter 12. The jointly administered cases were dismissed with prejudice and the debtors were barred from seeking bankruptcy relief for 180 days. The debtor’s case proceeded with the creditor motioning to dismiss the case on the basis that the debtor was ineligible for Chapter 12 as not being a family fisherman with regular annual income, and because the debtor unreasonably delayed providing critical information, mismanaged assets and had no reasonable prospect of financially reorganizing. The debtor claimed that it was eligible for Chapter 12 because even though its sole owner was a corporate entity, the court should attribute the ownership of the individual members of the entity directly to the debtor. The debtor also claimed that it had “regular annual income” because it’s income and expenses were reflected on the tax return of the member entity. While the court noted that the statute (11 U.S.C. 101(19A)) clearly required the debtor to be an individual or an entity with a majority of the interests owned by one family, the court noted that it could overlook the intervening corporate member entity and attribute the ownership of the members of the member entity directly to the debtor. However, the court noted that doing so would be inequitable because doing so would grant relief to the same individuals who violated the court’s orders in the previous cases. The court also noted that the debtor had failed to establish that it had regular income by not providing any tax returns showing regular income and its schedules, statements and operating reports did not establish any regular income that would allow the debtor to make plan payments. The court also held that cause existed for dismissal of the Chapter 12 case because the debtor’s reorganization plan was entirely contingent on sale of the fishing vessel for $1.2 million which was highly speculative. The creditor’s motion to dismiss the debtor’s case was granted. In re Victorious, No. 15-10386, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 17, 2016).

Farm Debtor Entitled to State Law Exemption. The debtor filed Chapter 12 bankruptcy and listed the bulk of his crop sale proceeds on his bankruptcy schedules as exempt "farm earnings" in accordance with Minn. Stat. Sec. 550.37(13)(exemption for disposable earnings). The crop sales were evidenced by checks made jointly payable to the debtor and several secured creditors. A creditor and the bankruptcy trustee objected to the claimed exemption. Disallowing the claimed exemption would mean that more funds would be available to pay unsecured creditors. A creditor later claimed that because the checks had ultimately been turned over to another creditor that the issue was moot because the debtor no longer had any interest in the funds. The bankruptcy appellate panel, reversing the bankruptcy court, disagreed. The bankruptcy appellate panel held that the turnover of the checks to a creditor did not constitute a determination of what amount would be paid to unsecured creditors. Thus, the issue of whether the state law exemption provision applied was not moot. In the later court case on the matter, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor could exempt the farm earnings under Minn. Stat. §550.37, sudb. 13. The bankruptcy court held that exemption statutes were to be applied liberally in the debtor’s favor, and that farm proceeds constituted “earnings” under the exemption statute. The allowance of the farm proceeds as exempt did not, the court determined, violate the Minnesota Constitution because Min. Stat. §571.922 provided criteria to objectively determine a limit on a reasonable amount of property that could be exempted, and the amount of farm proceeds that could be exempt required an application of that statutory procedure. In re Seifert, No. 13-60831, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 241 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2016). Prior history, In re Seifert, 533 B.R. 265 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015).

Digital Photos and Website Eligible for Tools-of-the-Trade Exemption. The debtors, a married couple, operate a photography business that sells digitally manipulated landscape photographs to the public. The husband was also employed at a separate photo business. The wife handled all of the accounting, some promotional work and most purchasing decisions for the couple's business. The debtors filed a joint case, and sought to exempt their digital images and website as a tool-of-the-trade under Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 60-2304(e). The trustee objected on the basis that the images and website were not tangible property as contemplated by the statute. The bankruptcy court disagreed with the trustee, noting many books, documents and "tools" in today's electronic era are digital and that only the specifically listed items in the statute need be tangible property. In addition, the court noted that the debtor's wife could exempt the digital images and website herself as tools of the trade of her primary occupation. The wife had a sufficient ownership interest in the couple's business. On further review, the district court affirmed, noting that Kansas law does not limit the tools-of-the trade exemption to means of production or an otherwise narrow definition of the phrase. Rather, the court determined, the “use” of the item(s) in question is the key issue. Based on the evidence that the images served an integral purpose as a business card or portfolio to attract business for the company, the website and images were exempt as tools-of-the trade. The court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination that the debtor’s wife was entitled to the exemption. In re Macmillan, No. 15-4008-KHV, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166379 (D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2015), aff’g., In re Macmillan, No. 14-40965, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 61 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2015).