07-3204 - David L. Bell, Appellant v. Topeka, Kansas, et al.

U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
(April 10, 2008)

Briefs

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Case Summary (prepared at Washburn Law)

Nature of the Case

Plaintiff David L. Bell filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, alleging excessive use of force and violations of his due process rights by police officers. He filed suit against the police officers as "John Does" because he did not know their identity. By the time he learned of their identity, the statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied his motion to amend, and later granted summary judgment on all counts.

Issues

I. Whether the district court was correct in refusing to allow Bell to amend his complaint to name the officers.

II. Whether the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Bell had failed to produce evidence to show that the City had a policy or custom of allowing its officers to use excessive force or that the City was negligent in training or supervising the officers.

Plaintiff/Appellant's Position

Bell argues that the district court erred in refusing him to amend his complaint to add the names of the officers. He contends that the City refused to tell him the names, and that there was no way that he could have independently gotten the names of the officers through any other means. He argues that this should qualify for either the "relation-back" provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3), or at the very least should subject the statute of limitations to equitable tolling. Bell also contends that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was a policy or custom of the City to allow its officers to use excessive force, and that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the City was negligent in training or supervising the officers. He argues that, as a result, summary judgment was not appropriate.

Defendants/Appellees' Position

The Appellees argue that the City did not refuse to tell Bell the names of the officers, because he could have filed an open records request and gotten the names. The Appellees further argue that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) should not apply, because it covers only mistakes in identification. As a result, the district court did not err in failing to allow the amendment. The Appellees also argue that the district court did not err in determining that Bell had failed to produce evidence establishing that the City either had a policy or custom of to allow its officers to use excessive force, or that the City was negligent in training or supervising the officers.