05-3251 — Stacy D. Prier, Appellant v. Gary E. Steed

U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
(April 12, 2006)


BRIEFS

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CASE SUMMARY (prepared at Washburn Law)

Nature of the Case
Stacey Prier plead no contest to disorderly conduct under §5.10.025 of the Wichita Municipal Code. She was subsequently terminated from her employment with the Sedgwick County Sheriff's office because the Sheriff claims that her conviction disqualifies her from carrying a firearm pursuant to the Brady Bill, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and she would, therefore, be unable to perform her duties as a deputy. Ms. Prier filed suit against the Sheriff claiming that he violated the Family Medical Leave Act in terminating her and sought a declaratory judgment that her conviction did not bar her from carrying a firearm under the Brady Bill.

Issue Statement
Ms. Prier argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff deciding that Ms. Prier's conviction for disorderly conduct under §5.10.025 of the Wichita Municipal Code barred her from carrying a firearm under the Brady Bill, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Plaintiff/Appellant's Position
Appellant contends that her conviction of disorderly conduct does not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required under the Brady Bill. The Brady Bill states that it is unlawful for anyone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to carry a firearm. A misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is one which has an element of use or attempted use of force. Appellant argues that the element of "fighting or brawling" in §5.10.025 is not necessarily an element of use or attempted use of force as required by the Brady Bill. Appellant relies on the definition of fight and brawl to claim that it includes verbal altercations or physical acts and, therefore, the statute does not fit as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence because it does not necessarily require the use or attempted use of force. Appellant further argues that fighting comprised of physical violence would not fall under disorderly conduct because the use of physical violence would give rise to a battery or aggravated battery under K.S.A. 21-3412 and K.S.A. 21-3414. Because of this distinction, appellant contends that disorderly conduct under the Wichita Municipal Code is not a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence pursuant to the Brady Bill and she is, therefore, not barred from carrying a firearm.

Defendant/Appellee's Position
Appellee argues that the use of the terms fighting or brawling in the Wichita Municipal Code for disorderly conduct must be construed to mean the use of physical force because the Code includes a separate subsection for the use of offensive or obscene language. If fighting or brawling was interpreted to also include verbal altercations then the statute would be constitutionally overbroad and or vague. Because appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct for fighting with her spouse, a crime of domestic violence, she is barred from carrying a firearm under the Brady Bill.

INFORMAL CASE SUMMARY

Please Note: This informal case summary is not intended for official use and does not purport to be exhaustive of the issues or defenses presented by the parties.

Plaintiff Prier was discharged from her position as a deputy sheriff following her municipal court conviction on a disorderly conduct charge. She was advised that she was being discharged because her conviction constituted a domestic violence offense under the Brady Act which barred her from carrying a firearm - an essential function of her position. Prier filed suit against defendant Steed, the county sheriff, claiming that she was actually terminated in retaliation for lawful use of leave time. She also sought a declaratory judgment that her conviction did not constitute a crime of domestic violence under the Brady Act. The district court granted defendant Steed's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that under the Brady Act, Prier was barred from legally possessing a firearm. Prier voluntarily dismissed her claim relating to leave time and now appeals only the district court's Brady Act ruling.