03-3234 -- Judith A. Bryant, Appellant v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
(October 6, 2004; afternoon docket)
SUMMARY OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant argued that the district court should not have dismissed the employment discrimination case on summary judgment because there were issues of material fact regarding Appellant’s stated discharge. Appellant’s argument focused on the disputed issues that arose from its own affidavit. The affidavit compiled the company’s audits (employment reviews) of incidents with prior employees. One judge wanted to know why Appellant did not have an independent third party review the audits. Appellant’s response was that the affidavit merely compiled and organized the information. Judge Briscoe, however, wondered whether the people in the audits were in a similar position to the Appellant. Judge Ebel seemed to side with Appellant on this issue when he noted that the similarity did not matter because the audits showed that the company was not being honest. Appellant’s strongest argument was that the company seemed to go after Appellant by auditing her more frequently in order to oust her from her job.
Appellee argued that the affidavit provided by Appellant was flawed. The affidavit did not calculate the information correctly, mischaracterized the audits, and only gave bare conclusions. The only evidence that Appellant had was this audit and that was not enough to overcome summary judgment. Appellee’s strongest argument was that Appellant’s contention that she was fired for pretextual purposes was flawed because it was not a substantial reason. The audits did not demonstrate that Appellant was fired for pretextual reasons and Appellee contended that the audits demonstrated that she was fired for poor performance.
CASE SUMMARY (prepared at Washburn Law)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Judith A. Bryant appeals a judgment in favor of her employer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, in her civil action for employment discrimination on the basis of age and gender. She claims that she was wrongfully discharged. The District Court granted the employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, Bryant contends that the District Court erroneously held that the evidence supporting her pretext argument was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial on the merits.
FACTS
Beginning in 1992, Judith Bryant was employed as a regional marketing manager by Appellee’s predecessor. She was promoted in 1995 and again in 1996. Most recently, she was employed as Claims Director for Recreational Products Insurance (RPI) at Appellee’s regional office in Overland Park, Kansas. For the first two years after her promotion, Bryant received satisfactory performance evaluations. Beginning in late 1998, however, Bryant’s newly assigned supervisor was openly hostile to her and suggested that she transfer or quit. He issued a negative evaluation regarding her work performance in 1998. Bryant testified that the evaluation was inaccurate and failed to reflect several accomplishments. Again in 1999, the same supervisor evaluated Bryant’s work as unsatisfactory.
On January 31, 2000, Bryant was placed on probation, allegedly for failing to meet Appellee’s claims audit goals. Because her work did not improve during her probationary period, Appellee discharged her on March 10, 2000. At that time, Bryant was 56 years old. She argues that she was terminated (1) based on gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination; and (2) based on age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
ISSUE
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Appellee on the basis that Bryant failed to show that the proffered legitimate reason for terminating her was a pretext for gender or age discrimination.
ARGUMENTS
» Appellants’ Argument
Bryant argues that she was terminated based on her gender and age in violation of applicable federal and state statutes. On appeal, she challenges the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the Appellee. Specifically, she argues that the District Court erred by disregarding certain evidence she presented in response to Appellee’s summary judgment motion. Bryant claims that if properly considered, the evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact warranting trial on the issue of whether the stated reason for her discharge was pretextual for gender or age discrimination.
Bryant contends that she has presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of Appellee. First, she was replaced as Director of Claims for RPI by a 35-year old male employee, who told another employee he had been hand-picked to move to Kansas City in September 1998 with the understanding that he would replace Bryant. Second, she argues she was the only claims manager who was discharged for failing to meet the audit standards. She asserts that Appellee ignored similar audit results for other claims offices. Finally, she contends that her supervisor demonstrated a discriminatory bias toward older women. For example, he once told Bryant and another older female employee that “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” After Bryant’s discharge, other older women working in RPI were “forced out” by the new management team. In short, Bryant argues that Appellee’s stated reason for her discharge was “patently contrived,” and that the evidence she submitted in response to the summary judgment motion was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of gender and age discrimination.
» Appellee's Argument
Appellee contends that from 1998 until her termination in 2000, Bryant continuously failed to meet minimum performance criteria. Other employees who “failed” audits without being terminated worked in different positions, in different offices, for different supervisors, and in different parts of the country. Therefore, because those employees were not similarly situated, any different treatment is not evidence of discrimination against Bryant. Further, Bryant offers no evidence as to the gender and age of other employees who she claims were treated differently.
Bryant has not controverted the Appellee’s evidence that she received unsatisfactory performance evaluations for the two years before her discharge. Appellee gave Bryant every opportunity to improve her performance, but she failed to do so. Because Appellee had a legitimate business reason for terminating her, and because Bryant failed to offer any evidence that Appellee’s stated reason was pretextual, the District Court’s decision should be affirmed.
WHY THIS CASE IS INTERESTING
In an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff can withstand the employer’s summary judgment motion by offering evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the reason the employer articulated for the adverse action is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The question in this case is whether Bryant’s proffered evidence in response to the Appellee’s summary judgment motion was enough to reveal such weaknesses and contradictions in the alleged legitimate business reason that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find the employer’s stated reason unworthy of belief. If so, the Tenth Circuit should reverse and remand for trial; if not, the Court should affirm the judgment in favor of the employer.
INFORMAL CASE SUMMARY
Please Note: This informal case summary is not intended for official use and does not purport to be exhaustive of the issues or defenses presented by the parties.
Plaintiff Bryant appeals a district court order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that defendant's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was pretextual.
Plaintiff, claims director for defendant's recreational products insurance, was terminated from her employment at age 56 based on the results of an audit in which she failed to meet compliance and performance goals. She initiated an action alleging age and gender discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She claimed that the reason for her termination were pretextual, arguing that her supervisor and her replacement conspired to replace her, that these individuals skewed the results of the audit by pulling certain files, and that the audit was inaccurate and reflected performance not attributable to her. In a declaration, Plaintiff offered statistical evidence based on her examination of the data disclosed by defendant regarding other employees. The district court held the evidence inadmissible, finding that plaintiff did not have personal knowledge of the other audits she summarized, and that she did not establish herself as an expert witness.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the district court erred in excluding the statistical evidence contained in her declaration, erred in excluding evidence of other similarly situated employees who failed audits, and erred in failing to consider other compelling evidence of pretext.
